# Review of Current RBM and Accountability Practices in CIDA

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## Acknowledgements

Nicole Mendenhall of Performance Review Branch and Réal Lavergne of Policy Branch provided oversight and direction for this review. The following consultants (in alphabetical order) collected and analyzed the data and wrote the preliminary, draft and final versions of this report:

Anne Gillies (Universalia Management Group)

Moses Kiggundu

Brian Moo Sang (Universalia Management Group)

Mark Schacter (Institute on Governance)

Suzanne Taschereau

# Executive Summary

## Background

Since the 1990s, international donors have felt an increased need to enhance aid effectiveness of publicly-funded initiatives; and many have adopted performance management approaches to help realize this objective. Performance management implies rigor in the definition and achievement of developmental results, as well as stronger accountability relationships between donors and government, within donor agencies, between donors and beneficiaries/partners, and perhaps most fundamentally, between beneficiary organizations and their own constituencies. While accountability is a common preoccupation of all agencies using performance management as well as a key element of performance management, the two concepts are not synonymous.

Performance management systems are now common in the development assistance programs of nearly all OECD member countries. Recent studies have found that many of these agencies are experiencing a tension between managing for results (that is, using performance information to promote learning for better decision-making and improved performance of their investments), and managing for accountability (that is, demonstrating results achievement to internal managers and to key citizen/government stakeholders in the donor and recipient countries).

In CIDA's case, use of results-based management (RBM) has evolved since the mid-1990s in an attempt to address both learning and accountability concerns in managing aid effectiveness. Significant progress has been made by the Agency in defining concepts, frameworks and tools related to the effective use of RBM. However, as a consequence of CIDA's increased engagement in Capacity Development Initiatives (CDIs) and Program Based Approaches (PBAs), which appear to require somewhat different approaches to performance management, the Agency is beginning to feel increased tensions similar to those felt by other donors in balancing learning and accountability in pursuit of aid effectiveness. In the interest of contributing to the process of Agency renewal for aid effectiveness, CIDA[1], in 2001, launched several studies aimed at examining the special challenges of, and important issues in, performance management and accountability for its investments in CDIs and PBAs. This review is one of those studies.

## Purpose and Methodology

The purpose of this review is to examine RBM and accountability practices in CIDA, with specific attention to the operational issues surrounding their current and potential application to CDIs and PBAs. The review was guided by a matrix which consisted of nine topic areas based in part on the Treasury Board Secretariat's *Guide for the Development of Results-based Management and Accountability Frameworks* (August 2001).

This review was co-directed by Performance Review Branch and Policy Branch, while the data collection, analysis and reporting was carried out by a team of five contracted individuals. The main source of data for the review was an opinion survey of 36 selected CIDA staff and partners (mainly CEAs including NGOs, private firms and institutions) who were interviewed between November 2001 and February 2002. Qualitative analysis of the data was undertaken by the review team to identify themes, categories or patterns that emerged from the various

[1] Performance Review Branch, the Capacity Development and SWAps Networks, the 3B Group and the Business Transformation Unit

interviews. A draft report was prepared in March 2002 and shared in April 2002 with review participants and members of the Capacity Development, SWAps and Performance Networks in a series of meetings and discussions facilitated by CIDA. Participants validated review findings and provided additional insights and information which have been incorporated into this version of the report.

## Review Findings

A total of 14 findings emerged from the review covering a wide spectrum of operational and institutional issues identified by development practitioners both inside and outside CIDA. The key findings are summarized below.

**Institutional context and values** (Findings 1,2,3,14) – The review found that RBM has generally had a positive effect on how the Agency and its partners manage certain development initiatives. However, some institutional factors and attitudes within CIDA require more attention so that they support, rather than inhibit, the effective application of RBM to CDIs and PBAs. These include:

- excessive use of RBM as a compliance mechanism rather than as a dynamic, learning-based management approach;
- the need for a change of mindset;
- the need to institutionalize appropriate guidance and incentives to use RBM as a strategic management tool;
- insufficient experience and field knowledge of some CIDA project officers;
- funding practices and systems that continue to support or reward activity-based reporting.

**Roles and responsibilities** (Findings 4,5) – The roles of CIDA, its overseas and Canadian partners are changing as aid programming evolves in new directions with CDIs and PBAs. This implies the critical need for CIDA to clarify new roles for itself and its partners and to invest in capacity building for its staff and overseas partners to support them in pursuing their redefined responsibilities.

**Objectives and logic** (Findings 6,7) – Flexibility, sensitivity and increased resources for partner capacity building and partners' meaningful participation in results definition can help promote the positive and constructive use of performance logic in CDIs and PBAs.

**Risks and risk management** (Finding 8) – There are a wide variety of perspectives, about risk management and its place in performance management, and considerable ambiguity regarding the types of risks and uncertainties that need to be addressed in CDIs and PBAs. Risk and risk management in CDIs and PBAs provide CIDA an opportunity to explore how to work constructively with calculated risk.

**Performance measurement and monitoring** (Findings 9,10) – Misconceptions about the need for direct attribution of development results to CIDA's inputs, and challenges faced in the selection and application of indicators for CDIs and PBAs need to be addressed in order to facilitate and demonstrate appropriate ways to measure and monitor performance in CDIs and PBAs.

**Reporting, evaluation and audit** (Findings 11,12,13) – Constructive and consistent use of assessment information as part of a continuous learning cycle for CIDA and its partners is crucial to resolving tensions in how to assess and increase long-term effectiveness of CDIs and PBAs.

## Conclusion

The review identified five key areas for CIDA's consideration that will support Agency investments in CDIs and PBAs. These suggestions are put forward with the intention of supporting and complimenting current change initiatives in CIDA.

### Transform Agency business practices

Funding arrangements need to reflect the reality of how layered accountability really works in arrangements like CDIs and PBAs. The Agency should consider creating new funding arrangements that are designed to address shared responsibilities and joint accountabilities in support of aid effectiveness.

### Strengthen program-level results management

The Agency's new *Results Based Management and Accountability Framework* (CIDA 2002) is widely viewed as a positive step towards the effective vertical integration of Agency, program and project level results. Program frameworks can help link the different levels of results if they are well-defined and clearly show connections between lower and higher level results. CIDA staff and partners need clear and timely guidance and support to successfully close existing gaps between Agency goals/Key Area Results and 'project' level CDI and PBA results .

### Enhance the Agency's strategic vision and values

RBM is the 'how' of performance management, but an organization's vision and values should clarify the 'why'. RBM will only be as effective as the norms and values that anchor it. Given some noted continuing challenges at the project level, more attention needs to be paid to institutionalizing Agency values and practices that articulate and demonstrate its commitment to performance management, in order to support effective performance of all its investments including CDIs and PBAs.

### Improve training and skill-building in performance management

The Agency should consider investing further in developing the skills that Agency staff require to support effective end-use of performance management in CDIs and PBAs. In addition, the Agency should also consider putting more effort into identifying the needs of its overseas partners and investing more consistently in building their capacity over the long-term as part of CDIs and PBAs.

### Improve utilization of frameworks/guides/tools in performance management

The Agency should consider reviewing the appropriateness of existing frameworks, guides and tools, and develop and pilot new ones, as required, to ensure that they actually work in practice, enhance performance of CDIs and PBAs and are useful in promoting further learning in the Agency in practical and strategic ways.

## Acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| APPRs | Annual Project Progress Reports |
| BRAC | Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee |
| CD | Capacity development |
| CDFs | Country Development Frameworks |
| CDIs | Capacity development initiatives |
| CEAs | Canadian Executing Agencies |
| CIDA | Canadian International Development Agency |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee |
| DFAIT | Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade |
| IUCN | International Union for the Conservation of Nature |
| KARs | Key Agency Results |
| LFA | Logical Framework Analysis |
| MIS | Management Information System |
| NGOs | Non-governmental organizations |
| NPM | New Public Management |
| OAG | Office of the Auditor General |
| ODA | Overseas Development Assistance |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| OECD-DAC | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee |
| PBAs | Program-based approaches |
| PIP | Project Implementation Plan |
| PMF | Performance Measurement Framework |
| PPRs | Project Performance Reports |
| PRAS | Planning, Reporting & Accountability Structure |
| RBM | Results-Based Management |
| RMAF | Results-Based Management and Accountability Framework |
| SAP | Systems Assistance Processes |
| SOP | Statement of Principles |
| SWAps | Sector-wide approaches |
| TA | Technical Assistance |

## Acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| TB | Treasury Board |
| TBS | Treasury Board Secretariat |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNFPA | United Nations Family Planning Agency |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |

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# Appendices

# 1. Introduction and Purpose of the Review

## 1.1 Background to the Review

CIDA's Performance Review Branch, the Capacity Development and SWAps Networks, the Pilot Projects Group and the Business Transformation Unit have joined forces to sponsor a set of studies on the special challenges of managing for results and accountability when RBM is applied to capacity development initiatives (CDIs) and program-based approaches (PBAs) to development such as SWAps.

Four studies are being produced from this initiative, including:

- A Reference Paper on RBM, Accountability and Aid Effectiveness for CIDA officers engaged in managing CDIs and PBAs.
- A review of current RBM and accountability practices in the Agency, with specific attention to the operational issues surrounding their current and potential application to both CDIs and PBAs.
- A Statement of Principles (SOP) on RBM and Accountability for Enhanced Aid Effectiveness in CDIs and PBAs.
- An Operational Guide (OG) on RBM and Accountability for Aid Effectiveness

This set of studies is intended to contribute to the process of Agency renewal for aid effectiveness by raising awareness of important issues in performance management and accountability, and clarifying how to deal with them in ways recognized by the Agency, Treasury Board (TB) and the Office of the Auditor General (OAG). Aid effectiveness has increasingly become part of international and Canadian agendas, and includes such principles as strong partnership, local ownership, and improved donor coordination. CIDA's increased engagement in CDIs and PBAs is the operational manifestation of these principles. [2]

## 1.2 Purpose of the Review

The key purpose of the review was to investigate practical issues and tensions in applying RBM as an approach to management of performance and accountability, with a specific focus on concrete experiences in CDIs and PBAs.

[2] According to CIDA's Corporate Memory data base, CIDA programming involving capacity development increased from 9.6% in 1990/1991 to 73.7% in 2000/2001.

## 1.3 Review Methodology

### 1.3.1 Review Matrix

The review matrix consisted of seven topic areas, each guided by a series of overarching hypotheses drawn from previous studies, the draft Reference Paper and SOP, and the professional experiences of the investigators. The topic areas were adapted from the Treasury Board Secretariat's (TBS's) *Guide for the Development of Results-based Management and Accountability Frameworks* (August 2001). Two additional topic areas – General Views on RBM and the CIDA Institutional Context – were added to enable exploration of the underlying issues driving RBM and accountability practice in the Agency. The review matrix can be found in Appendix II.

### 1.3.2 Working Definitions of Key Concepts

**Capacity development** was defined as "a process by which individuals, groups, organizations and societies enhance their abilities to identify and meet development challenges in a sustainable manner" (Qualman & Bolger 1996). While all development interventions are to some extent intended to develop capacity, the review focused on projects and programs that have an explicit focus and investment in developing the capacity of individuals, groups, organizations and sectors to learn, adapt and perform. These initiatives usually have one or more objectives that explicitly focus on capacity development, which are then translated into developmental results at the outcome level.

**Programs** can be defined as "long-term, multi-activity endeavours implemented by networks of country institutions in multiple locations whose production and/or service delivery objectives and impact goals derive from indigenous policy choices" (Brinkerhoff 1991). This covers SWAps and SWAp-like initiatives in sectors such as education and health, as well as PBAs in support of civil service reform or human rights. PBAs could also include core support for integrated, long-term programs of individual organizations involving a number of funding agencies.

**Accountability** was defined as the obligations associated with fulfilling a given mandate and exercising stewardship in the wise use of resources. In democratic systems of governance, organizations and institutions (including government) are accountable to their constituencies for their performance and the wise use of public resources. The Canadian TB specifies that Canadian government departments (such as CIDA) have an "obligation to demonstrate and take responsibility for performance in the light of agreed expectations". This can include: 1) striving for and demonstrating results; 2) making efficient and effective use of resources; 3) assessing and managing risks; and 4) compliance with laws, regulations, policies and procedures.

**Results-based management** was defined as a methodology for performance management that focuses on end results, in which various forms of accountability (financial and otherwise) are integrated. CIDA's *Introductory Guide to the Concepts and Principles of RBM (1999)* defines it as "involving key stakeholders in defining realistic expected results, assessing risk, monitoring progress toward the achievement of expected results, integrating lessons learned into management decisions, and reporting on performance".

While RBM and accountability are obviously linked, the review made a conceptual distinction between RBM as an approach to *managing for results,* and accountability as being primarily focused on *demonstrating* results in the fulfillment of a given mandate and the wise use of resources.

### 1.3.3 Assumptions

The review strategy was based on the following assumptions:

- The review was meant to inform eventual development of an Operational Guide that would enable RBM to be more effectively applied within CDIs and PBAs involving multiple accountabilities and partners. Therefore, while some general information on RBM's application was collected, the priority was on generating analysis that would enhance learning specifically in CDIs and PBAs.
- The review focused on the practical application of RBM policies, concepts and principles. It aimed to add value to existing studies on RBM and to avoid repeating what others have already done in analyzing either the theory or utilization of RBM in the Agency. It tried to take a balanced approach, recognizing both the achievements and challenges in practical application of RBM within various types of programming across all branches.
- The review tried to focus the discussion on projects whose explicit intent is to build capacity at the organizational or sectoral level, and on the complex accountability structures found in PBAs. In the latter case, some information was uncovered that also illustrates parallel issues between management of PBAs in developing countries and of CIDA's own country-level development program frameworks (CDPFs), in order to feed into concurrent CIDA research initiatives on this topic in Policy Branch.
- The review recognized that performance management and accountability practices involve multiple actors in complex relationships – CIDA officers, CEAs, NGOs, partners overseas, and these partners' own constituencies. It also assumed that there are likely to be differences in issues and practices of performance management and accountability across geographic, Partnership and Multilateral Branches. Data was collected from various perspectives inside and outside the Agency to identify the specific characteristics of RBM and accountability practices in each of these areas, prior to drawing any conclusions that would be applicable across the entire Agency.
- Finally, the review assumed that CIDA's interest is in looking to the future. The review made every attempt to contribute to emerging approaches to RBM and accountability for enhanced aid effectiveness within the Agency and elsewhere.

### 1.3.4 Data Sources, Collection Methods, and Analysis

Participants for the interviews were selected on the basis of the following criteria:

- Length of background experience with conceptual and practical dimensions of RBM
- Amount/type of practical project/program implementation and management experience (both inside and outside CIDA, in Canada and the field, etc.), including experience with CDIs and PBAs
- Level of interest in RBM and accountability issues
- Availability to participate

Following an open invitation to Branches to nominate participants who met the criteria, a representative sample of CIDA staff with experience in various positions and geographical areas was selected. Canadian partners (NGOs, CEAs and institutions) were selected on the basis of their involvement with a range of Branches and contracting modalities. An interview guide was developed for each category of person interviewed, and pilot tested.

Initially, a series of targeted, in-depth and open-ended interviews were conducted with 36 selected informants inside and outside CIDA as described in the table below between December 2nd, 2001 and February 1st, 2002. Each interview lasted from 35 minutes to two hours. A full list of interview participants is provided in Appendix III.

| INFORMANT TYPE | NUMBER OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED |
|---|---|
| CIDA RBM Specialists (all Branches) | 5 |
| CIDA Geographic Branch Project Officers (including CEE) | 5 |
| CIDA Country Program Managers/Directors | 5 |
| CIDA Program Analysts/Specialists | 5 |
| CIDA Multilateral Branch Program Officer | 1 |
| CIDA Local Staff | 1 |
| Canadian NGOs | 5 |
| Canadian Private Sector CEAs | 7 |
| Canadian Institutional Partners | 2 |
| **Total** | **36** |

Qualitative analysis of the data was undertaken by the research team to identify themes, categories, or patterns that emerged from the various interviews. This was done initially at the time of data recording, and later refined through the use of a qualitative data sorting process.

After preparation of a draft report in March 2002, a series of discussion and feedback meetings were held in April 2002 inviting all review participants (both inside and outside CIDA) and other members of the CD, SWAps and Performance Networks inside CIDA to provide further comments on the preliminary findings. Approximately 50 people attended these meetings, including a high level of representation from non-CIDA review participants. They validated the review findings and provided additional insights and information into key areas. Some of these comments were incorporated into the final version of the review report.

### 1.3.5 Limitations

This study has a few limitations which are listed below:

- The review was designed more as a survey of informed opinion and analysis than as a full-blown academic study. More complete empirical work would have required extensive case analysis and quantification of results. The study should be treated as an overall snap-shot of key current issues that can be used to provoke further analysis and discussion, rather than as an end in itself.
- The review covered a relatively small sample of participants, although these participants were selected carefully to ensure a wide range of background and experience. Nonetheless, it should be noted that participants from CIDA Multilateral and Canadian Partnership Branches are under-represented in the sample. This is because the uses of RBM and accountability under study are its uses at the project level, a modality that is

not much used in Multilateral and Canadian Partnership Branches. Of course, the organizations supported by Multilateral and Canadian Partnership Branches do use the project modality, and the results of this study will thus be of relevance to them.

- The review did not include any interviews with overseas partners involved in implementing CIDA-funded projects. Although several CIDA and CEA/NGO officers were interviewed who were very familiar with the perspectives of overseas partners, and with the two Branches, the perspective that is captured here is essentially that of CIDA and CEAs.
- Because PBAs, particularly SWAps, are at an early stage of planning or implementation, information on the use of RBM in these instances was sometimes partial or limited.

## 1.4 Report Overview

Following this introductory chapter, the second chapter provides a brief overview of the donor and CIDA contexts for performance management and accountability. The third chapter summarizes the key findings of our review, while the final chapter summarizes our main conclusions and identifies some areas for possible CIDA follow up.

# 2. Context for Review of RBM and Accountability Practices

## 2.1 Donor Context for Performance Management and Accountability[3]

"Reinventing government", " doing more with less", and "demonstrating results that citizens value" all became popular catch phrases to describe the philosophy and expectations of the New Public Management approach prevalent in OECD countries such as Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and the USA during the 1990s.[4] According to the OEC-DAC Working Group on Aid Evaluation, public sector reforms in the OECD countries have been common since that time, and are distinguished by the following characteristics:

- A focus on performance issues and achieving results
- Devolution of management authority and responsibility.
- Orientation to customer/stakeholder need and preferences
- An emphasis on participation and teamwork
- The reform of budget processes and financial management systems
- The application of modern management practices

Performance management systems based on these characteristics have been applied in the national development assistance programs of nearly all OECD countries to make them more effective and results-oriented. The common elements of these systems include identifying clear and measurable objectives, selecting indicators, setting explicit indicator targets or benchmarks, developing performance monitoring, analyzing and reporting on results against pre-identified targets, using evaluations strategically, and using performance information to increase internal management accountability, learning, and decision-making. Accountability has been a common preoccupation of all agencies using these systems, especially internal accountability that holds agency managers and units responsible for results achievement.

A recent study (*Results Based Management in the Development Co-Operation Agencies: A Review of Experience*, OECD-DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation, Paris, November 2001) notes that there is a tension between managing for results and accountability for results.

- **Managing for results** uses performance information primarily to promote continual learning for better management decision-making, and to improve performance further. As such, it involves a process of analysis, reflection, and internal self-assessment at both the project and program levels.
- **Accountability for results** focuses primarily on using performance information to ensure accountability to domestic stakeholders (including governments and key citizen constituencies), to development partners, and for internal management purposes. It is

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[3] Section 2.3 is largely adapted from the study *Results Based Management in the Development Co-Operation Agencies: A Review of Experience*, OECD-DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation, Paris – Executive Summary by Ms. Annette Binnendijk, November 2001. The study covers the donor agencies of the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Denmark, as well as UNDP and the World Bank.

[4] For a description of the global changing trends in public administration, see Aucoin, 1996.

usually closely linked to the public sector audit function, in that it is important to demonstrate through the audit process that accountability concerns have been fulfilled.

Potential tensions have been identified in most donor organizations between these two approaches. In some OECD donor agencies, evidence suggests that a so-called "audit-accountability mentality" has taken precedence. This is understandable, given that prudent use of public funds is a major political concern.

However, the risk is that a pure accountability focus shifts results management down to the input-output level due to the relative ease with which such information can be collected on an annual basis. Because managers have more control over this level in most projects, they may tend to focus on outputs, since they know they will be held accountable by senior managers.

Research has also shown that a focus on managing for accountability leads to emphasis on measuring pre-set targets rather than on analyzing the performance context. In contrast, managing for results is equally concerned with collecting information on the factors and issues that affect performance in different instances, and taking lessons from this analysis to further adjust strategies or performance at either the project or program level. According to OECD/DAC, within this systemic tension, "accountability tends to be backward-looking and often focused on fault-finding, whereas learning/management improvement takes a more positive and forward-looking approach" (OECD/DAC, November 2001, p. 16). The dilemma for donor agencies is how to create the right balance of performance approaches for *both* managing for results and accountability for results. This influences the mix of systems and management behaviours found in any given institution.

OECD/DAC research has concluded that "there is growing evidence that the two primary uses of performance management systems – these are (a) for accountability reporting (e.g. holding an agency and its managers accountable for results), and (b) for management improvement (e.g. learning and decision-making) – may not be entirely compatible; they imply focusing on different types of results data and alternative methodologies, and may even influence management incentives and behaviour differently". Donor agencies like CIDA are dealing with the challenge of how to create the best mix between accountability and learning. Accountability is a reality in the context of global public sector management, as is the need to create learning within a shared vision for increased aid effectiveness. Every agency is dealing with its own unique blend of circumstances, and CIDA's own evolution in this regard shows how it has attempted to steer the best course between aid effectiveness and public stewardship.

The concept of "shared accountability" has been proposed as a more sophisticated "third way" to emerge in performance management. For example, performance accountabilities might be defined at a "higher level" (e.g. for forming partnerships and for managing for results, instead of achieving specific, pre-set results) than what is currently found in some donor performance management systems. However, this would probably require a systemic shift in how the institution or agency views performance, accountability, and results management.

## 2.2 Context for Performance Management and Accountability at CIDA[5]

CIDA as an agency has a long preoccupation with accountability and results-oriented management; however there was increased attention to such matters in the 1990s in response to a combination of global and domestic pressures in the public sector, as described in the previous section. In Canada, both at the federal and provincial levels, public concerns over a growing public debt increased the demand for more accountability for the use of tax dollars. To respond to these pressures, governments initiated a series of public sector reforms. Reviews based on need, affordability and efficiency of all government programs resulted in departmental budget cuts and significant downsizing. This was accompanied by renewed emphasis on results-oriented business planning, accountability and performance reporting for agencies such as CIDA. The new approach, driven by the TB and OAG, involved ongoing systemic changes in public sector management in CIDA and other government departments.[6] In 1996, TB's "Reform of the Estimates Project" introduced three main results-based documents that became a requirement across the federal government system.[7]

In 1992, CIDA initiated its own Strategic Management Review, and in the following year (1993), the OAG undertook a comprehensive audit of the Agency. The audit addressed the need for CIDA to clarify its strategic policy framework, establish a results-oriented and accountability style of operation, improve internal management procedures and practices, and improve the measurement and transparency of results reporting. CIDA launched its Corporate Renewal initiative in 1994 and adopted a more results-oriented and accountable style of management at headquarters and in the field. Working closely with the OAG, an innovative three-phased follow-up approach was designed to monitor the Agency's progress in dealing with the above concerns, assess whether CIDA's Renewal Plan was being implemented, and gauge how CIDA had resolved the concerns raised in the 1993 Audit.

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[5] This section is adapted from an early version of the Statement of Principles, prepared by Réal Lavergne and Moses Kiggundu in October 2001.

[6] See *Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons*, Chapter 29, Canadian International Development Agency, Phased Follow-up of the Auditor's Report- Phase II, November 1996 (http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/96menu_e.html); and *Implementing Results-Based Management: Lessons from the Literature*, Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2000 (www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/other.nsf/html/00rbm_e.html). Similar documents on RBM are available on the web sites of the US General Accounting Office (USGAO), and the OECD.

[7] The TBS's three results-oriented documents constituting the "Reform of the Estimates Project" are: 1) *The Business Plan*, a three-year rolling departmental plan with key results commitments, performance indicators and estimated costs; 2) *Planning, Reporting & Accountability Structure(PRAS)*, an annex to the *Business Plan* that replaces the *Operational Planning Framework* and provides a clear description of departmental program, management and delivery structure; and 3) *Performance Report*, an annual report on progress achieved toward the department's results, which replaces Part III of the *Estimates*. The OAG may audit the use of performance indicators.

In April 1996, as part of this long standing commitment to become results-oriented, CIDA's President issued the *Policy Statement on Results-Based Management in CIDA.* This statement consolidated the Agency's experience in implementing RBM and established some of the key terms, basic concepts, and implementing principles. RBM has become the cornerstone of the Agency's management philosophy and practice, and has served as the basis for the development of a variety of management tools, frameworks, training programs, and guides now in use across the Agency.

At the end of 1997, the OAG carried out a review of the way CIDA produced the Geographic Program section of the 1996-97 Performance Report to Parliament. Using the Annual Project Progress Reports (APPRs) as the main source of project information, the OAG Report pointed out that more meaningful, accurate and balanced reporting was needed, and recommended that CIDA place reported results in the context of time and degree of significance to the overall development program for the country. The OAG affirmed its interest in the measurement of CIDA's contribution to development results and effectiveness of aid at the country level, and it expressed a good understanding of the difficulties of attribution in a multi-donor environment by stating: "What is important is that lasting development results be achieved, not that they be attributed directly to the intervention of any particular donor. This type of reporting would reinforce CIDA's move to focus more on development results, and would improve accountability for the effective use of ODA funds."

In July 1998, CIDA's Executive Committee approved *the Agency Accountability Framework*. This document defines accountability as a situation of stewardship in which the steward must demonstrate results in the fulfillment of a given mandate, and the wise use of resources put to his or her trust. This basic definition of accountability obliges CIDA to determine its objectives, demonstrate how the resources allocated to CIDA for international development purposes are managed in achieving intended development results, and report the results achieved to Parliament and the Canadian public. Monitoring and learning are considered critical to inform the appropriate decisions and actions necessary to achieve development results in the inherently high-risk and uncertain environment of development assistance. The framework articulated CIDA's accountabilities in terms of development and operational results at the overall agency level, as well as for its various development initiatives. The concepts of partnership and local ownership were defined as fundamental to the nature of CIDA's accountability for development results. CIDA and its Canadian partners were said to hold *shared accountability* for development results within the context of the interdependent partnerships with recipient governments, and international and local partners. CIDA's shared accountabilities for development results begin when it makes the decision to engage in a partnership for development. Partnership starts with shared commitments, continues with shared control and management, and leads eventually to shared accountability for development results.[8] CIDA's

[8] This is similar to the concept of *joined-up accountability.* " Joined-up accountability involves the pursuit of an accountability regime that is sensitive to the multiplicity of players in the governance process, their heightened interdependence, and the growing importance of horizontal linkages captured so well by the notion of collaborative government" in Canadian public administration. Quoted from *Governance for the 21st Century: Joining-up Accountability* by Professor Kenneth Kernaghan at the CAPAM Conference on Governance and Joined-Up Accountability. See the CAPAM Newsletter, Vol.7, No. 2, 2001, Toronto, Canada. For discussion of collaborative government in Canada, see Susan Delcourt and Donald C. Lenihan, *Collaborative Government: Is there a Canadian Way?,* Institute of Public Administration of Canada, Toronto, 1999.

recent public consultation document, *Strengthening Aid Effectiveness* (2001), has continued to emphasis these points.

Both RBM and accountability as concepts and tools for development effectiveness continue to evolve over time. Increasingly, both concepts are becoming closely linked because accountability is conceptualized in terms of results, and results are the mechanisms for meeting accountability expectations. This linkage was emphasized at the CIDA January 24, 2001 Forum on SWAps and Accountability. The central message to emerge from the Forum was the need to think in terms of developmental effectiveness first and foremost, and to use accountability as a way of telling the story in a clear and transparent way. A comparison of “old” and “new” definitions of accountability showed how ideas and thinking have changed. The old understanding was more hierarchical, and bureaucratic, encouraging rules and process-based approaches to accountability. The new understanding is expectations-based, encouraging a greater focus on results. This shared understanding helped to forge the elements of a consensus in favor of more flexible approaches to accountability under partnership arrangements, as represented by CDIs and PBAs.

The linkage between RBM and accountability applies at all levels of CIDA activities, from the corporate level down to the individual project levels. At the corporate level, CIDA produced its first Results-Based Management and Accountability Framework (RMAF) in February 2002, as required by TBS’s *Policy on Transfer Payments* from June 2000. The Agency RMAF includes the Key Agency Results or KARs, which are linked to the Millenium Development Goals. The next step will be for the Agency to operationalize the RMAF via a comprehensive effort to produce country program or division performance frameworks that link project and program achievements to higher corporate results.

# 3. Review Findings

Within the evolving context described in the previous section, the RBM review's aim was to explore how those who are engaged in the everyday work of implementation concretely manage the tensions and decisions that arise from both managing for results and managing for accountability. The following section highlights key findings from the review and provides illustrative examples of tensions and issues that are drawn from actual practice. Specific reference is made to CDIs and PBAs where data was available.

## 3.1 General Perceptions of RBM in the Agency

**Finding 1: RBM has made a practical and positive difference in how CIDA and its partners manage development initiatives, especially at the design and planning stage.**

There has been an on-going transition to RBM in the Agency since 1996, and the review validated the extent to which RBM appears to have yielded positive benefits for effective project planning and management. There is a general perception that RBM is here to stay after several years of transition and experimentation, and that the Agency's use of RBM is consistent with the requirements of the broader development context. Review participants stated that results-based performance management is now seen as a necessary and important tool for increasing aid effectiveness.

CIDA and non-CIDA participants were generally consistent in their understanding of the objectives of RBM, which included: enhanced planning of CIDA interventions and increased specificity about intended results and constraints; greater focus on substantive results rather than on activities and administrative processes; improved monitoring frameworks so that project activities could be adapted along the way to better achieve objectives; and greater involvement of partners in managing for results.

While participants acknowledged their initial skepticism about RBM, most agreed that they would not want to go back to activity-based management for reasons that are noted in the sidebar.

> It makes a lot of sense ...to us and to our partners overseas. I like the idea of focusing on change, of asking questions like "so what difference do we want to make over time?" and "how will we know?—*CEA representative*
>
> RBM forces us to be more rigorous... and to work with our partners to reach consensus of what we want to achieve ...—*NGO representative*
>
> It's a roadmap...a moving and living process of management – it keeps the project focused and on track, while allowing managers to deal with unexpected results. —*CIDA officer*
>
> It is an excellent planning tool that provides an understanding of project aims and identifies key challenges. —*CIDA officer*
>
> I love RBM. It has forced CIDA and its partners to focus on results. It requires a change of mindset as well as the talent to recognize strategic opportunities and the willingness to work in uncertainty – but if you have passion, a good vision and the right information, you can manage well and get better development results. —*CIDA officer*

**Finding 2: Tensions exist between the use of RBM as strictly a compliance mechanism and as a dynamic, learning-based management approach. The former approach appears to be gaining precedence over the latter, which some feel is inhibiting the kind of dialogue and communication required for vibrant relationships between CIDA and its partners, particularly in CDIs and PBAs.**

In spite of the many positive perceptions about RBM, the consensus from nearly all interview participants was that RBM is currently being used more as a mechanism of control (i.e. to reinforce stricter accountability requirements) rather than as a system for learning and improving performance. Several CIDA review participants who had been involved with the initial introduction of RBM in the Agency said that this was probably because RBM was viewed primarily (albeit erroneously) as a reaction to the OAG's demands for more rigorous Agency accountability to the Government of Canada in the early 1990s.

The vast majority of review participants recognized that a combination of *both* managing for results and managing for accountability were needed within the Agency. However, both CIDA and non-CIDA participants expressed their concern that administrative processes were triumphing over content – that is, that increasing value was placed on ensuring compliance with procedures (such as completing LFAs and PPRs, or filling out various RBM matrices), while less attention was paid to understanding substantive development processes and strategies.

Many concrete examples were cited of what participants saw as the compliance bias as it has developed in RBM. Some review participants stated that the Agency reporting system requires people to justify what has been done, but not to tell honest performance stories. Non-CIDA participants reported experiencing increased demands to report against planned activities and expenditures, and decreased interest in reporting on enabling or management results, development outcomes and how iterative management was being applied. They also noted increased feedback from CIDA project managers on administrative issues, but rarely on substantive development issues. Furthermore, it was stated that current funding arrangements tended to reinforce a compliance bias, and did not allow for multiple accountabilities in project implementation.

As public servants, CIDA officers and managers saw themselves as mainly accountable for results within the larger Agency and Government of Canada system, which possibly led to a tendency to over-manage interventions. Officers said there appeared to be little incentive (in professional terms) to try and do anything except exercise more control over a situation when in doubt about what results were being achieved. Non-CIDA participants cited multiple examples of what they perceived as micro-management of projects by CIDA officers, which they associated with a lack of trust and also perceived as an over-emphasis on accountability concerns.

The majority of review participants (both inside and outside CIDA) felt that the foundation of effective RBM lay in building trust between CIDA and its development partners. Participants suggested that a compliance bias was generating incentives for CIDA to be more risk-averse, backward-looking, and focused on what CIDA and its partners could control and measure. A mindset overly focused on compliance was said to be getting in the way of developing the kind of dialogue and communication required for vibrant relationships between CIDA and its partners, particularly in CDIs and PBAs. According to review participants, without trust the development of an open analytical dialogue between CIDA and its partners would be difficult to create or sustain.

**Finding 3: Sufficient changes have not yet occurred in the mindset of development practitioners to support the most effective use of RBM as a dynamic and strategic performance management system.**

Both CIDA and non-CIDA respondents felt that developing effective RBM practice required a significant shift in mindset and a new way of thinking about management – a shift which has not always accompanied the paper transition to RBM at CIDA. Numerous examples were cited by CIDA staff, and by outside observers of the lack of deep transition to RBM. Others felt that there were few incentives to change the existing mindset as the structures within CIDA are not really being driven by an interest in development results and learning. Concerns were also raised that there were few incentives for using RBM effectively in a learning-based way, due to the time investment required. Consequently, many within the Agency appear to be getting hung up on what is perceived as the heavy or cumbersome aspects of RBM (definitions of terms and the design of logic models, for example) that inhibited their ability to really work with it effectively as an overall strategic management approach.

Many interview participants stated that RBM was an effective management system or philosophy, but only if it was well applied within the appropriate enabling environment. It was observed that the spirit of true partnership that underlies an effective results management approach may be what is missing. This perspective from inside the Agency was corroborated by many CEAs and NGOs who were interviewed – their interpretation was that CIDA was still focusing too much on activities and outputs rather than on processes and outcomes, and that the rhetorical emphasis on managing for results through a process of mutual learning was not yet matched by the reality of what they saw happening at the Agency.

## 3.2 Roles and Responsibilities

**Finding 4: For any development initiative to succeed, it is fundamental that local partners take ownership and responsibility for results, particularly in the case of CDIs and PBAs. However, this will require support for partner capacity building as well as changes to the accountability and funding arrangements used to support programming.**

The vision of putting partners in the driver's seat appeared to be an elusive one for many of the review participants, in spite of the fact that many of them both inside and outside the Agency were keen to experiment with various forms of participatory planning and implementation techniques, as well as with creating project and program models based on local ownership. Realistically, it was noted that donors still had the upper hand in many PBAs, even though the ideal was to strive for more local control.

A key question of whether overseas partners have a real chance to participate in project design was raised by review participants. There was the question of who owned the very end of the results chain – was the impact CIDA's formulation, or some other group's? Nearly all review participants agreed that greater accountability and ownership for results needed to be shifted to overseas partners and that more coordination and negotiation for joint accountability had to take place. Several CIDA review participants agreed that local ownership could only really happen if CIDA gave CEAs and local partners more breathing room to manage for results on their own, without too-close CIDA oversight. Sometimes, in order to do this, review participants stated that overseas partners needed front-end training to build their planning and implementation capacity. The sensitive use of RBM has apparently created some space within which multi-party responsibilities and accountabilities can be negotiated over time through a participatory, locally-owned planning and management process.

It was clear from what most review participants said that RBM was influenced by numerous CIDA operational obligations associated with funding or contracting arrangements.

On the one hand, some review participants felt that contractual obligations for results reporting and delivery should be more strictly defined in terms of accountability for results. On the other hand, several participants both inside and outside CIDA were concerned that certain funding arrangements were already too rigid and focused on legalistic interpretations of accountability (in service contracts in particular). Such arrangements were felt to provide little scope for a more open-ended or relationship-based approach to accountability. This was of particular concern to many both inside and outside CIDA who wondered how the evolutionary nature of many CDIs and PBAs could be accommodated with any sensitivity within the current contractual regime for the Agency.

**Partner-Led Agenda Setting for Development**

The Bangladesh Rural Assistance Committee (BRAC), in response to the donors' rejection of an earlier proposal, developed their own performance framework that represented the organization's own objectives. BRAC then invited their potential donors to provide their inputs to produce a next iteration of the framework that all donors felt they could accept. Individual donors then developed their own contracting arrangements representing their contributions, each of which was generally consistent with and contributed to the results in the BRAC LFA, but with minor modifications to suit donor requirements. This system allowed BRAC to set the overall program "approach" but enabled each donor to tailor performance management in order to meet their own developmental priorities.

CIDA, for example, is obligated by Canadian legislation to ensure that certain environmental issues are addressed in investments such as BRAC. In this case, CIDA felt that BRAC's plan did not provide enough reference to the monitoring of environmental concerns. BRAC, while accepting that the environmental monitoring was important, did not feel that CIDA's environmental monitoring agenda should take a prominent place in its plan. After an environmental assessment was undertaken by a CIDA consultant, CIDA demonstrated a high level of trust in BRAC by accepting that they would pursue the environmental monitoring without needing to have it prominently represented in the performance framework. Further, CIDA agreed to low-intensity periodic reporting by BRAC on their environmental monitoring rather than on insisting on continual formal reporting.

For example, when a CEA signs a service contract with CIDA, it is legally accountable to the Agency and to the Government of Canada for the delivery of certain products or services to overseas partners. As its legal accountability is on the line, it might hesitate to shift responsibility for many developmental activities and results directly to overseas partners. If the partners have weak management capacity and cannot deliver, then it is the CEA's own credibility and viability that is at stake as a contractor of the GoC. This can affect its willingness to negotiate a bigger share of planning and implementation with partners, and constrains partners' ability to take full ownership of results.

Other funding arrangements such as contribution agreements or responsive contracting mechanisms were said to be somewhat better at allowing for joint accountability. Some non-CIDA review participants cited examples of contribution agreements being managed like service contracts, with strict accountability requirements that precluded responsive or relationship-based arrangements and had negative effects on local ownership.

**Challenges of Creating Local Ownership for Results in a Post-Conflict Situation**

The Kosovo Educator Development Program was developed as a bilateral responsive contract by CIDA. A Canadian CEA was contracted to undertake capacity-building of local educational institutions in support of improved teacher-education and ultimately improved approaches to teaching in Kosovo. Ideally, all local partners and counterparts would have participated in the original project design. Realistically, however, local factors – the post-conflict nature of Kosovo, weak, fragmented and/or non-existent local institutions, and a lack of trust among key local proponents – prevented this approach from being feasible. These circumstances, combined with the pressure to start the project quickly due to its linkage with certain UN processes, led to the decision that a broadly participatory approach would not be pursued. Alternatively, the CEA led the process of developing the results framework with "selective input" from key local stakeholders. As the project moved forward and local capacity improved, efforts have been made to revise the original results framework to take into account changing needs, priorities, contextual concerns and understandings of local partners. Eventually, it is hoped that local partners will take complete responsibility for results achievement and sustainability.

NGOs operating under contribution agreements were well aware of the need to build local partner capacity as part of development implementation, and usually tried to ensure that adequate resources were available to assist local partners in capacity strengthening. However, they were not always successful in getting this accepted as part of their financial arrangements with CIDA.

Overall, review participants considered that local ownership was crucial to current and future success of any development initiative, but that enabling this to happen in reality would take careful thinking and a re-examination of the systems used to support programming. Review participants inside and outside CIDA believed that the capacity of overseas counterparts has a huge influence on whether local or joint ownership for results could be achieved, and on the accountability relationships that can be established.

**Finding 5: Shared accountability for results requires a new support and accompaniment role for CIDA, based on negotiation, participation and direct capacity-building with partners.**

The requirement to build partner capacities as part of undertaking CDIs and PBAs means that new functions have to be taken on by the Agency in facilitating the planning and design of such initiatives. Throughout the Agency, there was an explicit recognition that CIDA would increasingly play a support and accompaniment role, rather than, or in addition to, a managerial one. The challenge was one of describing and managing these new relationships, and ensuring that the Agency had the skills to fulfill these new roles.

Experience to date in SWAps has shown that considerable time was needed at the front end to enable partnerships to be built, capacities to be assessed, and strategies to be developed. In some cases this role was carried out by external consultants or implementing agencies, but in other cases CIDA officers had to be actively involved themselves. In several instances local partners had to be coached extensively to assess and plan their capacity needs, with CIDA staff playing a facilitative role in these and similar processes. The ease with which CIDA officers were able to do this often depended on their background, skills, and level of experience. For example, at least three officers interviewed with previous experience in working in project management for NGOs were quite comfortable playing this role.

**Partner Capacity Building to Enhance Local Ownership**

The CIDA-funded Canada-India Institutional Cooperation Project is a strong example of how working to build the capacity of local partners over time allows them to take on stronger roles and responsibility for performance management and accountability. At the outset of this project, which focused on improving the delivery of vocational training in three southern Indian states, the project was generally being planned and managed by the Canadian institutional partner with consultation from a variety of local partners. Over time, the Canadian partner attempted to increase local institutional ownership through increasing the partners' strategic planning and management capacity and the establishment of partner-level planning and coordination units. All this was done with the intent of ensuring a high level of staff participation and complete transparency in decision-making processes. By mid-project, the local partners had not only increased their ability to plan and direct the CIDA programming – they were doing virtually all of their own planning with inputs from the CEA as opposed to the reverse – but also had improved their own institutional management by introducing and renewing strategic plans. The Canadian partner worked throughout to improve local ownership by ensuring that overall responsibility for implementation was clearly in the hands of local partners.

In all of the examples shared by review participants, it was evident that the Agency had made considerable headway in terms of using participatory approaches to support most effective uses of RBM. Acquisition of participatory development skills and expertise, in terms of how to work with local partners in the most sensitive way possible, appeared to assist Agency staff in playing a more effective role. Review participants considered that local partners needed to be involved from the very beginning; the role of donors was increasingly one of coordination, providing the broader overview and making the space for local ownership to evolve.

According to review participants, the biggest challenge was for CIDA to know when to let go, and when to intervene strategically. Some CIDA review participants saw their primary role as administration of transactions and ensuring compliance with Agency guidelines and contractual obligations. Others saw their role as fostering collaboration between Canadian and overseas partners, facilitating dialogue and joint development of results statements among stakeholders, supporting partners' capacity to manage and account to their stakeholders and constituencies, and playing a brokering role with other donors. They tended to have a dynamic and close working relationship with CIDA field staff, national partners and CEAs, and other donors. Other CIDA review participants pointed out the key role of CIDA field officers who added value by building bridges, remaining locally knowledgeable, identifying and guiding resources for capacity development of partners, and monitoring results and changes on the ground. Overall, from the perspective of some CIDA review participants, new types of roles, skills, and aptitudes needed to emerge in the Agency, with appropriate support and mentoring, in support of new accountability relationships for development partners.

**CIDA's Use of Facilitation and Negotiation to Create Partner Knowledge and Trust**

In a project managed by IUCN in Russia, the CIDA officer and the Branch's RBM Specialist went to the field and facilitated a multi-day planning and consultation exercise themselves in which they imparted basic RBM concepts and worked with IUCN managers and local partners to walk through the logic of what they wanted to achieve from their perspective. This helped the local partner and the implementing agency clarify how certain strategies and results were connected. During this exercise, discussions were conducted about the partners' accountability at the outcome level, which allowed all parties to reach a common agreement on the type of accountability relationship that would be best suited for the project. A detailed performance framework that allowed them to monitor the linkage between activities, results, and expenditures was also developed during this CIDA-led exercise. The performance framework for the project was detailed but still flexible enough to allow for subsequent iteration as new needs and priorities emerged. The CIDA personnel demonstrated strong skills in planning, participatory processes, training, facilitation, and negotiation with local partners, which were instrumental in building relationships and creating trust.

**CIDA-Led Capacity Building Process Fails to Build Local Substantial Ownership**

The Malawi AIDS mini-SWAp demonstrated that a facilitated planning process involving extensive capacity-building, even one that takes place locally, can fail in producing local ownership if working relationships and expectations are not fully understood by both sides. At the outset of the initiative, the local counterpart – under the direction of a new Executive Director – rushed to produce a management plan without support from potential donors. The result was a weak strategy that lacked clarity in its performance logic, assumed unlimited resources, and ultimately was not accepted by the donors. CIDA program managers took a lead role in supporting the counterparts' efforts to redesign their performance framework by providing a variety of TA, including a planning workshop to produce a five-year strategy. This initial planning workshop was followed up by a capacity assessment, further refinement of the results logic through other workshops held with NGOs and the government, collection of baseline data, and a final design mission. While the resulting work plan and strategy was initially viewed as very strong, it soon became clear that the "real" local ownership that had been generated by this process was somewhat limited. The counterpart, had viewed the TA process more as "changing the goalposts" of the program rather than further developing their thinking. The counterpart had some control over the TORs for TA, but felt that the results were still CIDA-owned. Ultimately, CIDA had to take a step back from their role as the lead facilitator for partner capacity building. In retrospect, CIDA staff felt that the urgency of the AIDS pandemic played a role in prompting fast action over a long-term planning process that have proved successful in other SWAps. In addition, CIDA felt that the counterpart had difficulty in recognizing the limitations of their capacity to satisfy funding conditions, and in taking responsibility for their own capacity building.

## 3.3 Objectives and Logic

**Finding 6: Logic models serve an important purpose in development management approaches such as RBM. However, they have to be used cautiously and sensitively to avoid a mechanical approach to design and implementation for all investments including CDIs and PBAs.**

The concept of the logic model is that results causality and sequencing can be represented in a summarized, abstract and two-dimensional diagram or table, which is the basis for the Logical Framework Analysis matrix, otherwise known as the LogFrame or LFA. The LFA in one form or another has been in use in CIDA since the 1970s, and was further adapted to a results-based presentation in 1997 during RBM's introduction into the Agency. Nearly all programs, projects, or initiatives in the Agency now use some variation of the LFA in both planning and reporting, whether it is called that or not. [9]

[9] The LFA has been replaced in CEE Branch, for example, with the PPF or Project Planning Framework matrix. While the fields are arranged differently from those of the LFA, the key elements of the LFA are still present in the PPF (i.e. goals, objectives, levels of results, indicators, etc.).

While the LFA is not synonymous with results-based performance management, and in fact predates RBM in the Agency by some years, its utility as a tool for both planning and management appears to be widely questioned under RBM. It may be that the LFA has become a type of lightening rod for those who are questioning the way in which RBM has been married to certain kinds of hierarchical accountability situations (especially in reporting). Review participants from inside and outside CIDA noted that there has been a strong tendency by some people both within and outside the Agency to treat any logic model, such as the LFA, as a "religion" leading to a rather mechanistic (and unrealistic) view of a project. As one participant noted, the cause-and-effect relationships on paper become the reality rather than an imperfect representation of reality in all its complexity. Another participant was concerned that the dogmatic belief in the "paper reality" of LFAs had led to low tolerances among officers for the "messiness" created by actual project implementation in the real world. Other review participants noted repeatedly how they sometimes struggled to reconcile the idealized logic found in the LFA with the complexities of real project management. Because the LFA by definition represents an abstraction of reality that is not in itself meaningful, it attracts the ire of those who see it as the clearest manifestation of RBM's apparent weaknesses.

However, participants did not advocate a complete abandonment of the LFA, even for CDIs and SWAps. Both CIDA staff and partners stated that the creation of a results logic framework for a project can play an important role in disciplining thinking and discussing alternatives. Nonetheless, it was generally agreed that because the thinking behind this logic is often not captured in the LFA itself, it would be dangerous to attribute too much weight to that matrix alone. As one CIDA review participant stated, "The problem is not the logic, but the way it is used." In fact, nearly all project officers interviewed emphasized that the detailed management plan or project implementation plan (PIP) is the real reference point for understanding the project's strategy and assumptions in detail. The quality of these documents (which are used in on-going project management) can often make up for the artificial or condensed nature of LFAs themselves, so they have to be used in conjunction.

Non-CIDA review participants were generally highly critical of the use of logic models in performance management, but not as critical as might have been expected. While one participant took a strong stance that logic frameworks simply "got in the way" of a holistic dialogue, the general trend among non-CIDA participants was that performance logic, despite being reductionist and too linear for approaches such as SWAps, was very useful, provided certain conditions were met. For example, given that the logic of performance was highly relative (to culture, time, place, individual personality, etc.), it had to be open to ongoing reinterpretation. CIDA needed to be an active and flexible partner in the on-going process of negotiating performance logic as a project evolved. Non-CIDA review participants also noted that CIDA officers were often fixated on original targets and not open to the possibility of changing them. In other cases, CEA or NGO review participants expressed concern about a tendency for CIDA officers to change performance logic unilaterally after implementing agencies or partners had committed considerable time and resources to building ownership for results across a broad range of stakeholders.

CEAs also raised the question of the level of accountability they actually do have for *achieving* outcomes versus *managing for* outcomes. Perhaps the distinction between these different types of accountabilities had not been adequately clarified for them. Many of these issues related closely to the concerns some review participants had about the ineffectiveness of iterative management processes in the CIDA context (see section 3.5 - Performance Measurement and Monitoring).

**Finding 7: Resources, time and incentives are required to develop partner-driven performance logic and to forge a collective vision for results between CIDA and its partners.**

CIDA staff, CEAs, and NGOs shared numerous examples of the use of participatory design and planning processes under the bilateral iterative line of business to ensure that an initial design was validated and clarified with extensive input from key stakeholders. Review participants agreed that adequate preparation time was needed to ensure that logic models truly reflected the reality of partner needs and expectations. This process might take considerable time in a relatively ordinary project, and presumably could take even more time in CDIs and PBAs. The key question raised by both CIDA and non-CIDA participants was whether the Agency was willing to commit the necessary energy and resources to do this properly.

**Increasing Local Management Capacities Through RBM Planning and Training**

The CARE Rwanda Women's Rural Support Program, funded through CIDA's Partnership Branch, works mainly with community-based women's groups engaged in income generation activities. In the early part of the project, CARE local staff felt that the performance logic outlined in the original LFA was unclear and that they were not able to link their own activities to what they thought were the intended results. Local staff received a multi-day training in RBM methods and tools to redesign the LFA in order to better reflect the linkages between results and activities, and to design a set of enhanced performance indicators. Following this training workshop, CARE noted a marked improvement in the quality of reporting by local staff, including an increased coherence in linking different levels of result and effective use of indicators to demonstrate achievements. Further, CARE observed an improvement in the ability of local staff to manage and to adjust their individual roles in a way that clearly contributed to the larger project goals. It was also apparent to CARE that the training "spilled over" from the individuals involved in this specific project, and that the learning was being applied in varying degrees to other projects, strengthening the country office as a whole. Interestingly, CARE noted that while CIDA's RBM materials were used in the field for training purposes, these on their own were not enough to build management capacity. On-going coaching during field visits by CARE staff provided further support and stimulated local capacities to adapt RBM to their larger programming needs in development.

The need to take the time to develop a common vision was a theme raised by all review participants in this regard. Unless this was done, they stated that it was unlikely that the performance logic, imperfect as it may be, would be of any use at all. Development objectives formed the basis of a clear performance framework, and these flowed up from the grassroots level and down from the country program or sectoral level. These all had to be linked in a coherent whole, which took some time in some instances with multiple stakeholders. The risk here, as one review participant stated, was that the "the planning never stops". Her point was that sooner or later, some form of logic framework, based on clear objectives, had to form a starting point for implementation. This could be revised again, however, once the project is underway.

Non-CIDA review participants, especially from the NGO sector, stressed that development objectives needed to be left to local proponents to define, and that such objectives could be very difficult to articulate in CDIs, due to their complex and interlinked nature. Therefore, a considerable investment of time was needed, and the question then became one of how to manage the process and mobilize the required resources. One CEA stated that CIDA had operated on the false assumption that both overseas and Canadian partners already knew how to do performance management, and that the Agency had not provided adequate resources to enable capacity building in this regard. Most important, capacity building often needed to start at the time of defining the performance logic of an intervention, and continue for months if not years. The review yielded many examples of efforts by project proponents to create and apply performance logic through a participatory approach. In some cases, CIDA invested considerable resources directly in this process, while in others the investment came out of project or partner funds.

CIDA review participants also stressed the extent to which CDIs posed special problems for designing performance logics. The majority of review participants did not advocate abandoning the logic model for CDIs and PBAs, but stressed the need to adapt its use to the reality of development programming. One review participant stated: "Even for CDIs, most groups and partners appreciate using the logic approach to define results, because it still helps them figure out and demonstrate the logic of what they are trying to achieve, even if that logic is not strictly linear in practice."

## 3.4 Risks and Risk Management

**Finding 8: There are a wide variety of perspectives inside and outside CIDA about what risk management is and what role it plays in performance management. Moreover, there appears to be considerable ambiguity regarding the types of risks and uncertainties that need to be addressed in CDIs and PBAs.**

Responses from review participants concerning the overall effectiveness of risk and risk management using RBM were quite varied. While most agreed at least in theory that risk analysis and mitigation was an important aspect of management, there was a tendency for review participants to focus on quite different facets of risk. For example, CIDA review participants focused more on risks related to the capacity of local partners (i.e. local project partners or counterpart ministries in PBAs), country level risks, and overall risks to the Canadian development investment, whereas non-CIDA review participants focused on the role of local partners in identifying and monitoring a broad range of contextual risks (i.e. social, political, environmental, etc.).

**By-Passing a High Risk SWAp Counterpart in Nicaragua**

The main risk identified in early planning stages of a Nicaragua health SWAp related to the ability of the local government counterpart, the Ministry of Health, to actually follow through on planning and take responsibility for delivering results. In this case, the mitigation strategy meant the rejection of the Ministry as the local counterpart in favour of a multilateral agency, the UNFPA. The Ministry was disappointed with this decision, but donors and the UNFPA have tried to work closely with the Ministry and will transfer some of the funding directly to the Ministry from the start to ensure that they do not end up being totally isolated from the program. Further, the UNFPA's staff is made up predominately of local experts, many of whom used to work for and will hopefully return to the Ministry to further enhance capacity. Given the sensitivity of "rejecting" the Ministry as being able to take full responsibility for implementation under the risk assessment carried out, it remains to be seen how relationships will be built over time as the SWAp unfolds.

**Creating Practical Risk Assessment Tools**

One large CIDA institutional partner found that CIDA's own tools for risk assessment, which look only at critical assumptions and associated risks, were not adequate for profiling risks at the outset of a project. They took the initiative to develop their own matrix that allowed them to not only identify risks and mitigation strategies, but also the warning signs for indicating if the assumptions behind the risks might not be holding true and what the effect of this might be on project implementation. The organization finds this matrix very useful in supporting on-going monitoring of risk, particularly in monitoring those outside the control of the program. Because it looks at the possible effects of specific risks on project implementation, it also allows managers and overseas partners to consider the real implications of risks, rather than focusing on them as "scapegoats" for potential project shortcomings.

Both CIDA and non-CIDA review participants stated that risk analysis was most often done during project design (e.g. at the concept paper, planning and inception stages of an initiative). This sometimes included organizational capacity assessments, socio-economic analyses, gender analyses and baseline data collection, all of which provided a good picture of possible risk factors, when it was done properly and comprehensively. However, many review participants stated this was not done consistently for all CIDA investments, partly due to lack of time and possibly the lack of specialist expertise in the Agency to guide these approaches. Many review participants also noted that although the initial risk analysis was prominently featured in the LFA and management plan, it often fell off the screen in the practical sense once implementation started.

Questions were raised repeatedly by both CIDA and non-CIDA review participants about the Agency's overall attitude toward risk. Non-CIDA review participants stressed the need for local partners do their own risk assessments, and the need for CIDA to trust its Canadian implementers to keep them broadly informed about risk. They provided many examples where this had been done effectively. However, while recognizing the merit of doing risk analysis, one CEA participant questioned the basic assumptions underlying the approach:

> The basic assumption is that if you are rigorous enough, you can develop more predictability. While there is some merit, and certainly increased comfort to this, development is inherently a risky business and much is unpredictable. The key question is: are we managing in a way that allows us to quickly identify emerging risks and to manage them?

The issue of how to improve informed risk-taking was raised by some review participants, but many participants also equated risk management with compliance requirements. Non-CIDA review participants believed that for CIDA the main role of risk assessment was not to ensure that a project succeeded, but mainly to provide evidence that risk was taken seriously in case of failure. They perceived a strong tendency toward risk-averse behaviour in the Agency, and a discouraging lack of open dialogue about risk with CIDA officers. Respondents inside the Agency noted that innovative or creative projects (which by their very nature carry a higher level of risk) were often overlooked in favour of safer projects. One CIDA program manager, for

**Partner Capacity as the Greatest Risk in the Mali Education SWAp**

Two of the biggest risks identified in the Mali education sector SWAp are the capacity of the local counterpart ministry to manage and administer the program, and the imbalance of influence and power between the donors and the local partner. CIDA decided that direct interventions in capacity building were needed to address the first risk. The program is being implemented using a design and delivery model, and capacity was built so that eventually the Malian counterparts (with support from a Canadian CEA) could do their own contextual studies to define needs and risks. The second risk is being addressed through policy dialogue, which allows risk management to be built into the process. No formal risk assessment was done for the Mali SWAp, but CIDA undertook institutional and capacity analyses to identify the institutional gaps and needs of the counterpart prior. Political risk assessments are done simultaneously at the country level by PSU and the program is adjusted accordingly. It was possible to share these concerns regarding capacity risks with the partner, but they had to be done carefully so as not to undermine their confidence in the capacities they do have. Further, the responsibility for managing this risk was shared between donors (i.e. other agencies are taking the lead role in building the management capacity of the Ministry). This requires CIDA to have a certain level of trust and give up a modicum of control to other agencies. CIDA's opinion is that realistic results will help manage risk, that is, results that take the time factor into account and are not defined at too high a level given the local context capacity to do the job that they have.

example, asserted that as many as 50% of proposals were rejected because they were too high risk. According to some, such an approach created disincentives among project stakeholders to be fully open about risk. Some non-CIDA participants believed that risk was downloaded to the partners so that CIDA did not have to take joint responsibility if something went wrong. Protocols for joint risk accountability were rare in the Agency; nonetheless, in some cases this attitude was said to be changing as CIDA and its partners tried to create honesty and trust around risk issues through the use of innovative risk management and monitoring strategies.

In relation to CDI's and PBA's in particular, one participant commented on the difficulty of building and maintaining local partnerships when the greatest risk to success and sustainability was perceived to be the lack of commitment and capacity within that selfsame partner. A related issue was how to communicate about such risks without upsetting or alienating local partners. While many agreed that dialogue on risk was essential, including the key concerns of governance stability and corruption, it was also stated that if CIDA was too open about how they saw counterpart risks, these same groups might be alienated. A major risk identified for SWAps by review participants was the ability and willingness of government partners to take ownership and follow through on performance, given their limited capacities in many instances.

In summary, a wide range of opinions were expressed that risk analysis was one of the weaker aspects of CIDA's current performance management approach. Several review participants, both inside and outside CIDA, noted that the Agency was simply not good or at the very least inconsistent in undertaking risk analysis. CIDA participants reported that there was a lack of corporate tools and guidelines for risk assessment, and that the lack of quality risk assessment was perhaps due to an overall dearth of analytical skills in the Agency in this key area.

**"Safety in Numbers" Approach to Risk Assessment and Management in a SWAp**

To a certain extent the Malawi AIDS mini-SWAp relied on a "safety in numbers approach" to risk management (in particular financial risks management). CIDA felt that if other donors were willing to invest that this was a good indicator of an acceptable level of risk. CIDA did do some of their own contextual, capacity and environmental risk assessments and took a role in leading the capacity building of the local partner. In retrospect, donors may have been overly optimistic about risks related to the capacity of the local partner and CIDA felt that it maybe should have done more in-depth capacity assessment. CIDA also relied heavily on its field officer, who is working closely with the local partner in Malawi, to monitor risk (including internal partner risks) on an ongoing basis, as well as maintain a close relationship with other donors who all actively share their impressions and concerns about risks.

**Kenyan Environmental Committees to Assess and Mitigate Risk**

In the arid and semi-arid areas of northern Kenya, a drought-recovery project, managed by the Canadian agency Partners in Rural Development with CIDA funding, has had significant success in using a community-based approach to risk assessment and risk mitigation. Community-nominated Environmental Management Committees were established by the project to assist in implementation by managing livestock pasture areas. In the areas most affect by drought, inter-communal conflicts over use of pasture lands were identified as a significant risk to the success of the project. The Environmental Management Committees took on the task of managing this risk, a task which included working with neighboring communities to demarcate pasture area, establish codes for use of pasture areas and water resources and administration of penalties for those who violated agreements. This approach has proven successful over time in managing the incidence of conflict related to competition for pasture lands. Partners in Rural Development has noted that one of the reasons for this success was that the responsibility for risk assessment and mitigation was spread both vertically and horizontally throughout the project among a number of proponents and stakeholders.

**Nepal Risk Assessment Strengthened by Linking Risks to Results**

In Nepal, CARE's local project staff undertook to perform a thorough risk assessment process with local partners at the beginning of the project that is updated with every subsequent workplan. Using the LFA as a starting point, CARE worked with local partners to identify key assumptions behind the project logic, in particular at the Outcome and Impact levels, and to rank both the likelihood of the assumption not holding true and the effects that this would have on the project. A simple matrix was developed to represent this analysis. Given that the assessment focused mainly on the Outcome and Impact levels, the majority of the risks identified were beyond the control of the project (i.e. beyond the effective range of conventional mitigation strategies). As such, the focus of mitigation strategies was more on raising awareness, at the village and district levels, about the possible eventualities should assumptions not hold true and that the project might have to develop appropriate responses to achieve its higher-level results. It was also decided that it would be unmanageable to try to prepare strategies for a variety of different scenarios and so the overall focus of the strategy was more preparedness for reaction. CARE managers felt that what made this approach to risk assessment and mitigation so strong was its clear link to the intended project results. The process also experimented with the most effective approaches for building local capacities in risk assessment and preparedness.

## 3.5 Performance Measurement and Monitoring

**Finding 9: A misplaced preoccupation with the need for direct attribution of development results to CIDA investments heavily influences how performance measurement and monitoring is currently carried out. While most recognize that this bias towards attribution is particularly inappropriate for CDIs and PBAs, to date little thought has been given to alternatives.**

According to many review participants, particularly those inside CIDA, attribution issues were a key concern in performance measurement and monitoring. Many CIDA review participants believed that RBM demanded that results had to be demonstrated as directly attributable to the resources or money that CIDA provided. A widespread (and largely erroneous) perception that the Treasury Board viewed accountability *only* in terms of direct attribution appeared to reinforce this tendency.

When probed more deeply, however, most CIDA review participants recognized that direct attribution was not really possible due to the complex factors surrounding any development intervention, but particularly in the case of CDIs and PBAs. They stated that in most cases, overall measurements of change were important but that a proven linkage to CIDA's contribution was not really possible. Within SWAps in particular, CIDA review participants expressed concerns that the direct attribution bias now prevalent in the Agency would not work, but that little thought was being given to alternatives.

Most non-CIDA participants recognized that direct attribution was not feasible. They were also concerned that they could not be solely accountable for achieving outcomes or impacts within a complex development framework. The perspective of review participants from CEAs and NGOs was that an over-emphasis on direct attribution could often be counterproductive in project management. Unfortunately, however, in many projects the drive for attribution has had direct consequences for CEAs, NGOs or local partners, who are often required to expend considerable resources in attempting to fulfill the perceived attribution requirements not just of CIDA but of multiple donors.

More than one review participant stated that attitudes about attribution had to change, so that CIDA and its partners could focus more on looking at overall change, however, this seemed to run counter to how performance measurement and monitoring was actually done at the present time. Some review participants noted that even if some form of logic model was used, it could still incorporate multiple donors and local partners who might all be jointly responsible for making a contribution to results. A new approach might be to have collectively defined measurement frameworks in which joint accountability was clearly spelled out. This would remove the direct attribution focus and allow for a more realistic performance measurement regime. Participants hoped that this approach would be feasible when there were clear program performance frameworks in place to guide management towards results at the broader level.

**What are the Limits of Attribution in Bangladesh?**

In a large reproductive health SWAp to which CIDA contributes in Bangladesh, the CEA concluded that to try and find out if any one donor was responsible for a certain proportion of project results (for example, a measurable increase in contraceptive use) was, in relative terms, meaningless. Based on its experiences, the CEA now believes that timeframes are such that donors have to measure success more in terms of progress toward results rather than in terms of fully achieved results.

In another initiative in Bangladesh managed by the same CEA, a local partner undertook a comparative study to determine if their initiatives related to girl child school retention were having a positive effect. The study compared drop-out rates of girl children in project areas to those in non-project areas and concluded that the rates in the former were noticeably lower. The study, based mainly on government statistics, was open to criticism as it did not take into account a wide variety of issues, such as the level of poverty (which is also known to affect retention rates), the lack of a base-line for comparison, and the general lack of scientific rigour in the methodology. However, a technically-controlled study would have required investments and time far beyond the scope of the project and in the end, the value would be questionable. Further, the CEA felt the fact that the local partner had increased their own monitoring capacity had been overlooked by CIDA. This was done through choosing to measure indicators related to results rather than the activity based indicators (e.g. number girls trained) that had previously been the norm. Unfortunately, this important project result was overshadowed by concerns about the rigour of the comparative study.

A short mention should be made here concerning the role of external monitors in performance measurement and learning. According to review participants, the use of external project monitors appeared to have declined under RBM, which had both positive and negative effects. On the one hand, a strong focus on internal monitoring meant that capacity had to be built among partners. While this was a struggle in some instances, mainly due to lack of resources and time, it also empowered many project proponents to gain new skills. On the other hand, CIDA review participants stated that internal project monitoring was often poorly understood and under-resourced, leading to key technical gaps which external monitors might have filled effectively. The majority of review participants, both inside and outside CIDA, supported a continuing role for external monitors, combined with the building of monitoring and performance measurement capacity among project partners and a more strategic use of monitoring data by CIDA officers to inform program decision-making.

**Finding 10: Performance measurement is being hampered by weaknesses in the selection and application of indicators, especially process indicators and measures of qualitative change that are important in CDIs and PBAs.**

Nearly all review participants expressed some degree of concern about the role of indicators in performance measurement. CIDA review participants made frequent reference to the fact that the sheer number of indicators being identified in many initiatives made for unmanageable and costly performance measurement. Further, a need for technical support in supporting the development of realistic indicators was identified.

Several CIDA review participants mentioned the importance of the Performance Measurement Framework, or PMF, in clarifying what strategies would be used to collect performance data. According to review participants, this framework was developed in a collaborative fashion by the CEA or NGO with input from local partners for use in most bilateral projects. CIDA officers were required to review this document and ensure it represented a feasible, cost-effective and appropriate monitoring plan

CIDA review participants claimed that indicators were not clearly understood by many partners, and that CEAs also had some difficulties converting data from indicators into effective reporting information. Lack of baseline data in many instances also limited the indicators' usefulness. Finally, it was mentioned by participants that a lack of common understanding and definition of CD frequently led to a poor choice of indicators for these initiatives.

Non-CIDA review participants expressed their concern that CIDA was still reluctant to deal with qualitative indicators and that RBM had more of a focus on "things that could be counted". They expressed concern that a compliance bias appeared to put greater emphasis on quantitative measurement. They were also concerned that CIDA was inconsistent in recognizing the importance in CD of process indicators. In some instances, the Agency still insisted on indicators being expressed in quantitative terms even if process indicators were more suitable. Generally, non-CIDA review participants stated that there was a misunderstanding of what indicated success in many CDIs, leading to poor performance measurement and poor use of performance data. Also, where performance measurement was seen primarily as a compliance rather than a learning tool in projects reinforced hierarchical models of accountability.

**Finding 11: While review participants acknowledge the potential benefit of iterative project management approaches for measuring the performance of CDIs and PBAs, there are significant gaps between theory and practice that need to be addressed.**

Ideally, continuous performance measurement and monitoring will contribute to iterative management and the constant evolution of targets and strategies. Due to the heavy focus on direct attribution, many review participants stated that performance measurement data was not always used to support learning and adaptation in the most constructive way possible. There was little evidence collected in the review to suggest that this was being done consistently or correctly. Some review participants noted that the PPRs were meant to be the major internal performance feedback tools for the Agency, but that the quality and scope of information found in those documents precluded any strong learning analysis from emerging that could lead to effective iterative management.

> **Misinterpretation of Iteration and Iterative Processes**
>
> A CIDA funded micro-enterprise project in Tanzania was managed by six different officers at CIDA over a period of 10 years. Each new manager brought a new set of skills and values to the project, thereby influencing its design and strategies. However, the changes made under the guidance of each officer fundamentally shifted the goals and objectives of the project over time. This forced the CEA to not only strive toward a series of ever-moving targets, but also to reach each new target within a vastly reduced timeframe (i.e. each iteration brought down by new officers essentially represented a new project with a one to two year time frame before the next iteration occurred). In this case, it appears that iteration was interpreted by CIDA officers to allow for an overly broad range of fundamental change to the project. Normally, this would require a project re-approval and a recasting of the budget, rather than a more discrete process of refinement and fine-tuning using on-going performance measurement data.

CIDA-based review participants, with a few exceptions, reported that effective iterative project management was not well understood or consistently applied throughout the Agency. Some noted that this was due in part to many officers not being comfortable with how to amend performance frameworks within current contractual arrangements. There was also doubt about how to reflect this constructive change in project documents. The majority of participants agreed that performance frameworks and strategies had to be realistic and flexible, so that change could occur if needed. In the case of CDIs and PBAs, participants agreed that the strategies had to evolve over time, and that this change had to be built in to the use of performance measurement data, but how to do this in practice was still a question.

Participants stated that problems arose in relation to iteration when evaluators looked only at original plans and strategies, and not at more recent versions, in order to judge performance several years later. The question in these cases was, were the changes ever officially documented, and if not, why? These situations have led to a loss of trust in some instances between managers and officers, between CEAs and CIDA, and between CIDA and local partners. In other cases, the evolutionary nature of a project was difficult to reconstruct later, due to staff turnover at a level of the project. This may have been due, in part, to poor documentation and lack of clarty about how to document change.

> **Iteration Instead of Cancellation**
>
> An energy sector reform program in Russia was subjected to a major contextual shift, including changes in the local partner, early into its implementation phase. These shifts led to the development of a series of gaps in approach that left CIDA concerned about the ongoing validity of the program and with a loss of trust in the CEA that nearly led to the termination of the program. However, as a considerable amount of time and resources had already been expended in the project until then, CIDA undertook to rebuild their trust in the CEA and attempted to salvage the project through project iteration. CIDA, the local partner and the CEA worked together to recast the project to focus on building management capacity in two local utilities and two regional energy commissions, rather than on the central power authority. This new scope was seen as being more realistic and achievable given the timeframe and resource levels. It should be noted that one of the reasons for this successful iteration process was deemed to be the open-mindedness of the local partner in taking part, and agreeing to (in writing), the program's iteration.

Both CIDA and non-CIDA respondents opined that additional time and resources should be allotted to the process of continual reflection and consensus building, in terms of how to use performance measurement data to adjust performance logic or strategies. Overall, it appeared that most review participants viewed iterative management is an ideal to strive for, but that in practice, concerns with certain types of linear accountability and compliance interfered with this being put into practice.

## 3.6 Reporting, Evaluation and Audit

**Finding 12: There is widespread confusion about whether the annual Project Performance Reports (PPRs) are primarily designed to address reporting, audit, accountability, monitoring or performance learning needs, or some combination of these aspects.**

Over half of the CIDA review participants commented on PPRs when asked to talk about the role of reporting in the present RBM approach. This reflects a high preoccupation inside CIDA with the purpose and role of PPRs. While some of the comments made by CIDA review participants were highly critical (e.g. PPRs are of questionable validity, too detailed, unable to captured the full story, etc.), most of critical comments were tempered with qualifications. For example, one participant noted that PPRs were "mechanical and burdensome" but went on to say that the they should not be discarded but simplified, as they were one of the few places where the Agency was forced to "tell the story" of projects.

Many of the critical comments on the PPRs expressed the view that their role and use was dominated by compliance concerns, and as such their internal analytical utility in the Agency was of limited value. From this perspective, they were not useful as learning tools to improve project performance. Several participants commented on the fact that the summarized data found in PPRs, viewed out of context, was not particularly relevant to a full understanding of developmental change in complex settings. When senior managers or outsiders such as the OAG looked at these reports, they had little or no context to work from and received only a limited view of project performance. Several review participants were concerned that the linkage between the PPRs and the SAP system had had a negative effect on RBM in the Agency. This was because the technical requirements of MIS appeared to dominate over the critical analysis of development results data, and was a contributing factor to further "boxing in" RBM.

Some CIDA review participants wanted to see changes in how PPRs were prepared in the early years of a project, due to the fact that they really only became useful summaries – in results terms – after at least two years. Another administrative issue was the annual timing of the writing and submission of PPRs, which according to many created unrealistic bottlenecks and stress for all concerned. It was suggested by more than one CIDA review participant that PPRs be updated continuously over the course of the year rather than during one "panic month". Several CIDA project officers stated that they received little or no internal feedback in the Agency on the quality or content of the PPRs, and that they were sometimes reluctant to identify problems with project performance in PPRs in case this would reflect badly on their own management skills. On the other hand, good examples were cited of program directors using the PPR process creatively as an opportunity for analysis and learning with their officers in the context of an annual joint assessment of both project *and* program progress.

One area of confusion reported by both CIDA and non-CIDA review participants was whether CIDA or its partners was ultimately responsible for PPR preparation. Most PPRs appeared to be completed by the partners, and then sent back to CIDA for validation and further refinement. One CEA noted that they were happy to do this as they felt that they were much better to able to capture the essence of the performance story, but others raised concerns about the need for a stronger joint analytical exercise with CIDA that would contribute to performance feedback and learning. CEAs were also concerned that information found in PPRs did not appear to be corroborated by CIDA from other sources, and that the PPR was sometimes used inappropriately as a performance monitoring tool by CIDA managers, with no backup information.

**Finding 13: Reporting and evaluation of program performance appears to be dominated by compliance issues as opposed to performance improvement and learning strategies, which may have negative effects in CDIs and PBAs in particular.**

A large number of CIDA and non-CIDA review participants said that when it came to reporting and evaluation, RBM was again being driven too much by a perceived compliance bias. Many review participants believed that Agency pressure for hierarchical accountability tended to force officers to take a stronger hand in controlling projects through enforcing rigid standards for performance reporting than they would have liked. It was stated by many CIDA review participants that reporting still focused mainly on activities and outputs, not higher-level results, as a consequence.

Non-CIDA review participants indicated that they were often unclear as to what CIDA wanted in terms of reporting. They felt that nearly all CIDA managers required something different, based on their level of comfort and experience. In their opinion, CIDA demanded activity-reporting as opposed to results-reporting, even though many CEAs and NGOs had tried to change this approach. Major inconsistencies were also noted between different branches.

CEAs also believed that CIDA managers seldom read reports or provided any substantive comments. They expressed frustration that what little feedback was provided frequently was negative. This was seen as a disincentive for rigorous, honest analysis and for making the effort to tell the full performance story to CIDA. Included in the box text are some sample remarks.

> We fail to see how results reporting is being used as a learning tool, as it is not being used by CIDA to capture and share lessons learned – it is tool of control. *NGO representative*
>
> Reporting is being used for compliance and accountability, not for learning and improving aid effectiveness. *CEA representative*
>
> We wasted a lot of time telling performance stories that CIDA didn't seem to want – now we think that the less you report the better, as you get no feedback anyway. *CEA representative*

CEAs and NGOs also said that the use of some reporting templates (such as the PPRs) provided by CIDA for partners actually reduced the capacity of local organizations to develop and utilize their own performance learning systems. There seemed to be little space for negotiating a reporting format with CIDA that would fulfill both accountability requirements and learning needs, with accountability requirements usually taking precedence.

According to many review participants both inside and outside CIDA, a focus on compliance created barriers for the effective use of reporting as a learning process about performance and performance improvement. One preoccupation expressed was how to use reporting most effectively in sharing and analyzing lessons learned in implementation, so that further adjustments could be made to project strategies. CIDA review participants expressed the concern that there were few mechanisms in place in the Agency's program or project management systems to enable local partners and/or CEAs from different projects (but with similar issues and themes) to get together and share their collective reflections on lessons learned. These officers stated that there was little sharing of lessons learned within the Agency.

A major concern expressed by CIDA review participants was the need to engage local partners in CDIs and PBAs more actively in performance reporting. For example, participants said it would be unfair to ask a local government partner to meet the requirements of all donors individually, therefore donors needed to coordinate so that the partner to produce a comprehensive report that they could all use. Again, the question of capacity was key, and this was another area in which CIDA would presumably need to offer accompaniment and support to overseas counterparts.

With regard to the evaluation function, CIDA review participants noted that mid-term or ex-post evaluations were not as common as several years ago, and that this lowered accountability expectations for CEAs, given that they knew they would seldom be scrutinized for overall performance later on. CIDA participants also took issue with what they perceived as the relatively low quality of performance evaluations still commissioned by the Agency, which did not support their effective use for learning purposes. It was asserted that in some of these cases, evaluators were hired who did not have the contextual background to do effective performance evaluations.

Non-CIDA review participants were concerned that in recent years, evaluation had also taken on a compliance approach, rather than focusing on joint learning for all involved. They asserted that transparency was key and that mistakes had to be acknowledged by all in an evaluation process for it to be effective. Accountability for outcomes in both reporting and evaluation was another matter that concerned several CEAs, because of a lack of clarity at the beginning about whether it was feasible for them to take responsibility for proving that outcomes had actually been achieved.

**Sharing Lessons Learned Among CEAs Through a Joint Reflection Exercise**

In one CIDA division, an officer noted from a series of CEA reports that several projects in the same country program, which shared some similarities both in terms of sector and approach, not surprisingly also shared similar programmatic concerns, challenges and issues. The Project Manager took the initiative of organizing a conference call between herself and a group of CEAs to collectively discuss and analyze lessons learned in all their projects, based on the analysis provided in their reports. While this is not a common approach within the agency, it has been suggested that many officers feel that this requires a tremendous effort in terms of organization. This particular project officer had support from her director for this initiative, and felt that it was an important step in creating a more conscious and coherent approach to working with lessons learned in the program. She has plans to further share common learning this year by hosting a face-to-face among all the involved CEAs, which CIDA will pay for. This project manager also noted that she felt that such a process should be institutionalized and used on a regular basis in all programs, in order to promote common learning and ensure that lessons from performance reporting are collectively shared.

## 3.7 CIDA's Institutional Context

**Finding 14: There are a number of institutional factors in CIDA that work against the effective use of RBM for appropriate accountability in CDIs and PBAs, including strategic management, human resource management and funding arrangements.**

Review participants were concerned about the following enabling factors in effective use of RBM for appropriate types of accountability, particularly in CDIs and SWAps:

*Direction and appropriate guidance/incentives for strategic management using RBM are not yet institutionalized in the Agency.*

CIDA review participants noted that the institutional understanding of accountability had to broaden to take multiple and shared accountabilities into consideration, this required a more holistic and strategic set of ideas about how to use RBM than currently existed in the Agency. Some participants thought that CIDA had lagged behind the rest of the aid community in developing performance management strategies, for a variety of institutional reasons. One was that the Agency lacked the skills and incentives for critical analytical work at the operational level, instead focusing on administrative issues. Participants noted the lack of CD specialists and those skilled in taking a multi-disciplinary perspective on programming. Others mentioned the need for improved understanding of RBM as an overall strategic management approach, not just in terms of interpretation of guides or completion of logic models. Another issue mentioned was an inconsistency in how RBM was used across the Agency. Also, the issue of the Agency's apparent preoccupation with compliance functions was noted repeatedly as a factor that negatively influenced effective use of RBM. Trust-building, dialogue, analytical skills, mutual learning and strategic thinking were noted as cornerstones of effective use of RBM for the most appropriate types of accountability. Overall, the picture that emerged was the need to revitalize the vision for RBM as a strategic management philosophy at the Agency-wide level, in support of an improved approach to accountability that combined both operational and analytical effectiveness.

*Some CIDA project officers lack sufficient experience and field knowledge to manage effectively using a results-based approach.*

CIDA review participants noted that the Agency had experienced a recent influx of intelligent and highly-qualified young officers with little or no significant field experience. Experienced and inexperienced staff alike stated that some officers had been prematurely placed in higher roles without having had sufficient training or systematic mentoring from more experienced officers. One officer noted that the value of overseas posting and experience was no longer being recognized within CIDA. Others stated that some officers lacked experience to perform an effective contextual analysis, which would allow them to manage iteration well. Less experienced participants noted that they also felt that they lacked support or training in various aspects of their job, including RBM, and had to search for other means which could provide much of their own training and support.

CIDA review participants said that more coaching and mentoring on RBM issues, including accountability, were needed. Among many Agency staff, there was a general perception that many senior managers did not support the learning and creative processes required to effectively implement RBM. According to these participants, project officers needed to use RBM in increasingly sophisticated ways, but lack of experience as well as lack of appropriate senior management input prevented that from happening. This was in contrast to one or two very strong examples of where program managers or directors had used RBM strategically to promote greater critical analysis and dialogue on project and program performance among their staff and partners.

Some review participants commented on the apparent correlation between the level of experience of the CIDA officer and his or her tendency to micro-manage and over-control projects. Less experienced officers showed a tendency, according to CEAs, towards higher levels of control. Some CEAs noted that in their experience, CIDA managers took a micro-approach to management when they were unsure of a project context/sector or of themselves. It was also stated that less experienced project managers were sometimes “out to prove themselves”, so they would “over-RBM” a project and ignore the necessary imperfections of most development realities.

**Exploring New Forms of Funding Accountability**

In 2000, the Multilateral Branch established a Task Force to explore an alternative funding arrangement with UNICEF, which recommended that the Agency had to let go of some direct accountability in favor of a new relationship different from that established under previous agreements. This involved the establishment of an umbrella grant agreement that would allow for a more simplified and flexible administrative arrangements than the funding agreements currently being used. Under this new system, funding for UNICEF programming will be provided from the larger grant in smaller portions using a PAD. UNICEF will then provide reporting to CIDA in one of three formats that will not refer to specific results from the PADs but will still be sufficiently linked to those agreements to satisfy CIDA’s accountability requirements, as agreed to by Treasury Board. In order for this system to work, CIDA has to have sufficient trust in the efficacy of UNICEF’s existing performance management system in capturing results, despite it not being identical to CIDA’s own RBM system. One CIDA project officer involved in the Task Force stated: “The OAG is actually quite supportive of new arrangements, and recognizes the need for more flexibility than we give ourselves. We put ourselves into a strait-jacket of our own making by being too rigid and controlling in the name of accountability. In the future, more of this type of model could be used in bilateral programs”. However, it has also been pointed out that such as arrangement does not allow for close scrutiny of management or administrative costs by CIDA, nor for critical feedback on the efficiency or effectiveness of UNICEF’s own development implementation systems.

Both CIDA and non-CIDA review participants noted that the relatively high rate of staff turnover in the Agency was a source of difficulty. It meant that performance logic was often difficult to reconstruct, due to a lack of continuity, and that dialogues between CIDA and its partners were cut short by job rotations. From the CEA perspective, CIDA staff turnover was discouraging as it was hard to get new officers “up to speed” on substantive issues, as well as adapt to a new management style.

*Funding practices and systems continue to support/reward activity-based reporting.*

While there is evidence that CIDA funding arrangements have begun to evolve in new directions, non-CIDA review participants repeatedly stated that in many cases they had not yet adjusted to the call for local ownership, to an increased focus on outcomes and impact, or to the realities of complex webs of accountability. More than half of the non-CIDA participants stated that they felt as though performance frameworks were used primarily as a tool to hold them contractually accountable for deliverables such as activities and outputs, rather than as constructive frameworks for performance learning. Whether or not the frameworks for funding can be reformed is a much larger question than that of the use of RBM, as RBM itself appears to have had little influence on the legal framework for project management used by CIDA. Review participants, especially those outside CIDA, were very concerned that the Agency should start to seriously explore different types of funding arrangements that would be less tied to linear or rigid interpretations of accountability for results, especially in CDIs and SWAps.

# 4. Conclusions and Follow-Up for RBM and Accountability at CIDA

## 4.1 Conclusions

Keeping the limitations of this review in mind, the following conclusions can be drawn:

- There is substantial commitment inside CIDA and among its stakeholders for effective results management of development initiatives at both the program and project levels. RBM is recognized as a valuable approach to development performance management, and there are many positive examples of its creative application by CIDA and its partners in projects, and increasingly in CDIs, PBAs and country or division programs.
- In spite of the generally positive view of the results-based performance management approach, there is still tension and confusion about how to strike a pragmatic balance between:

  1) managing to enhance learning,
  2) managing strategically for the achievement of development results, **and**
  3) managing to account for use of public funds.

  These aspects are not in fact mutually exclusive, but many are still struggling with how to reconcile them in constructive ways, both in "regular" projects and in initiatives that do not fit the "standard" project model, such as CDIs and SWAps.
- Realization of the full potential of results-based performance management in CIDA will require further changes in the Agency's management culture, institutional systems, staff behaviour and analytical skills. Early efforts to introduce RBM into CIDA may have reinforced its mechanical or simplistic use, in ways that did not reflect the underlying principles for results management espoused by the Agency. As a result, it appears that some CIDA personnel have focused more on the letter than the spirit of RBM, and that they have not yet internalized many significant strategic management concepts. This presents some challenges as the Agency moves to newer, different and more complex types of funding arrangements such as PBAs and SWAps.

## 4.2 Follow-Up

The following list suggests some of the challenges that the Agency may wish to address as part of current change initiatives in CIDA.

### Transform Agency business practices

Many of the findings of the RBM Review support the need for changing business practices and modifying Agency lines of business. The Agency should look closely at how funding arrangements should be adjusted to reflect the realities of new multi-level or layered accountability relationships. The Agency may need to transform old-style service contracting modalities into agreements that accurately reflect new-style joint accountabilities, including how funding arrangements can best support *both* learning and accountability needs in performance management. CIDA may also need to provide better direction to CEAs and NGOs regarding the level of flexibility that is allowed to them in the context of contribution agreements and/or responsive lines of business, and allow more flexibility for unforeseen circumstances or for strategic adjustments in the pursuit of project outcomes, and joint accountability for risks.

### Strengthen program-level results management

In February 2002, while the RBM Review was underway, Treasury Board approved CIDA's Results Based Management and Accountability Framework (incorporating the new Key Agency Results or KARs). This framework will provide the over-arching performance structure for all Agency initiatives (from the project to the program level) in the future, and includes three categories of development, management and enabling results. According to the RBM Review, there is a strong recognition both inside and outside the Agency that such a framework is essential for the effective vertical integration of a results-based approach, especially because enabling and management results are taken seriously. In other words, the Agency will be better able to measure and report on development processes as well as on end results. CIDA will need to rethink the way that it applies RBM in developing and implementing country or division level performance frameworks, and ensure that there is a strong change management strategy as well as the appropriate tools in place to support this shift. Clarification of the concepts of accountability and their application to program-level performance management will be necessary, such as exploration of how to further improve accountability relationships between CIDA, its partners and its ultimate beneficiaries, and how to incorporate policy-based considerations. The Agency should ensure that all its key external program stakeholders, particularly Canadian development NGO partners and CEAs, and their overseas partners, are well-informed about these program-level initiatives and drawn into discussions about their implications for performance management and accountability at the earliest possible stage.

### Enhance the Agency's strategic management vision

The review suggests that CIDA should clarify its vision for how strategic performance management can contribute to aid effectiveness. Nearly ten years after the initial launch of RBM at CIDA, a renewal process is needed to ensure that the underlying principles in the RBM Policy Statement still apply and are widely accepted.

Rather than focusing on RBM itself, the Agency could ensure that the philosophy of public sector performance management for development is clearly understood at all levels both inside and outside the Agency. In doing this, CIDA can demolish the misconceptions that currently exist about what type of accountabilities are required by Treasury Board and/or the OAG. Once these myths are debunked, the Agency can create a better comprehension of how accountability chains or webs actually function, including the roles of implementing agencies, the OAG and aid beneficiaries or partners, and clarify what mix of performance and assurance information is required to both manage and report against established goals. Through this process, more opportunities should be created within CIDA, and between CIDA and its Canadian and overseas partners, for on-going critical discussion around the best use of results management and accountability. CIDA also needs to establish an integrated risk management framework to provide guidance at various levels of the organization on the methods to identify and mitigate significant and highly probable risks. This should increase ownership for new accountability requirements, enhance the constructive role of audit and evaluation, and improve dialogue with Canadian and overseas development partners about their value-added in performance management.

### Improve training and skill-building on performance management

CIDA's internal training and refresher strategy around RBM should be reoriented to enhance analytical skills among Agency staff and improve their understanding of the underlying philosophy of performance management. This could include topics such as:

- how to capture complexity and non-linearity in describing performance results;
- how to use an iterative approach to performance management;
- how to work constructively with indicators and performance measurement;
- how to define new roles for all players in the context of increased local ownership and donor coordination;
- how to apply critical thinking and analytical processes within performance management; and
- how to ask the right questions to solicit significant performance information.

In addition, the Agency may want to invest in more on-going coaching and mentoring for its officers and for Canadian and overseas partners in terms of how they utilize a results-based approach to performance.

### Enhance the role of PPRs as management, learning and analytical tools

The review found that the use of the PPRs is being driven largely by Agency MIS requirements, as opposed to substantive development management issues and analytical processes. The Agency should conduct an assessment on how to improve the use of PPRs for active management decision-making, as well as the processes and systems that surround them. The PPRs could be linked more explicitly to an overall strategic management approach that incorporates learning (both inside and outside CIDA) through joint performance assessment with partners and stakeholders, and constructive joint analysis of accountability issues and concerns.

### Assess and improve guides and tools on performance management

Many of the existing Agency guides related to RBM have a very practical orientation, and have been used as how-to manuals, either by themselves or in combination with coaching or formal training. At this stage, the Agency should thoroughly assess or evaluate all existing RBM guides and tools to ensure that they accurately reflect the reality of management for results and accountability in the new programming context. In this way, existing guides could be edited, revised, or shelved, depending on whether they were judged to be of use at the present juncture.

The review found that many participants expressed caution about the overly rapid creation of an Operational Guide on CDIs and PBAs without a careful needs assessment to clarify its potential end-users and how it would be used. At the very least, the Agency should ensure a long period of hands-on pilot testing and subsequent revision for such a guide, so that it could be adapted over a period of one to two years as more is learned.

The review identified the possible need for tools or guides covering indicators and risk assessment. In addition, further research ideas put forward included:

- Detailed case studies of how performance management is being dealt with in CDIs and PBAs;
- A series of pilot initiatives with Canadian NGO or CEA partners, as well as with overseas partners and counterparts, to explore how innovative methods for planning, iteration, learning, reporting and joint accountability can be applied;
- In-depth study to examine the pros and cons of different funding arrangements within Branches and programs, and assess how they affect approaches to results management and accountability; and
- A study to obtain the overseas partner perspective on performance management and accountability issues.

Again, careful needs assessments should be carried out prior to any of these studies being undertaken, so that a strong focus on end-utilization is maintained.

# Appendix I List of Findings

Finding 1: RBM has made a practical and positive difference in how CIDA and its partners manage development initiatives, especially at the design and planning stage.

Finding 2: Tensions exist between the use of RBM as strictly a compliance mechanism and as a dynamic, learning-based management approach. The former approach appears to be gaining precedence over the latter, which some feel is inhibiting the kind of dialogue and communication required for vibrant relationships between CIDA and its partners, particularly in CDIs and PBAs.

Finding 3: Sufficient changes have not yet occurred in the mindset of development practitioners to support the most effective use of RBM as a dynamic and strategic performance management system.

Finding 4: For any development initiative to succeed, it is fundamental that local partners take ownership and responsibility for results, particularly in the case of CDIs and PBAs. However, this will require support for partner capacity building as well as changes to the accountability and funding arrangements used to support programming.

Finding 5: Shared accountability for results requires a new support and accompaniment role for CIDA, based on negotiation, participation and direct capacity-building with partners.

Finding 6: Logic models serve an important purpose in development management approaches such as RBM. However, they have to be used cautiously and sensitively to avoid a mechanical approach to design and implementation for all investments including CDIs and PBAs.

Finding 7: Resources, time and incentives are required to develop partner-driven performance logic and to forge a collective vision for results between CIDA and its partners.

Finding 8: There are a wide variety of perspectives inside and outside CIDA about what risk management is and what role it plays in performance management. Moreover, there appears to be considerable ambiguity regarding the types of risks and uncertainties that need to be addressed in CDIs and PBAs.

Finding 9: A misplaced preoccupation with the need for direct attribution of development results to CIDA investments heavily influences how performance measurement and monitoring is currently carried out. While most recognize that this bias towards attribution is particularly inappropriate for CDIs and PBAs, to date little thought has been given to alternatives.

Finding 10: Performance measurement is being hampered by weaknesses in the selection and application of indicators, especially process indicators and measures of qualitative change that are important in CDIs and PBAs.

Finding 11: While review participants acknowledge the potential benefit of iterative project management approaches for measuring the performance of CDIs and PBAs, there are significant gaps between theory and practice that need to be addressed.

Finding 12: There is widespread confusion about whether the annual Project Performance Reports (PPRs) are primarily designed to address reporting, audit, accountability, monitoring or performance learning needs, or some combination of these aspects.

Finding 13: Reporting and evaluation of program performance appears to be dominated by compliance issues as opposed to performance improvement and learning strategies, which may have negative effects in CDIs and PBAs in particular.

Finding 14: There are a number of institutional factors in CIDA that work against the effective use of RBM for appropriate accountability in CDIs and PBAs, including strategic management, human resource management and funding arrangements.

# Appendix II Review Matrix

| TOPIC AREA | UNDERLYING HYPOTHESIS OR ISSUES |
|---|---|
| General Views on RBM at CIDA | A general introductory question was asked at the beginning of each interview to invite participants to make any observations about the use of RBM by CIDA, based on their perception of RBM policy and application as well as any other relevant details that might not fit under the other topic areas. |
| Roles and Responsibilities | Both CDIs and PBAs bring into focus the central role of indigenous actors and their institutions in setting the agenda for development, and in defining and achieving development goals and results. CIDA, partner governments and institutions, Canadian NGOs and CEAs need to develop a common understanding of how to do collaborative or participatory planning and performance monitoring, as well as how to share responsibilities and accountabilities in various projects and programs. In practice, this requires time and resources to engage in dialogue and build capacity, both of which may run into disbursement and operational pressures in the CIDA programming cycle. The processes used for involving different actors at different points in time are of particular interest given CIDA's increasing orientation towards programs that respond to partner goals and priorities. |
| Objectives and Logic | In order to be effective as a performance management system, RBM has been applied using frameworks and logic models that need to be relatively easy to understand and sufficiently simple to apply. Logic models used in RBM (such as the LogFrame) are based on a linear, cause-effect logic. This is in tension with the reality of development processes (such as CDIs and PBAs) that are complex, multi-dimensional, non-linear, and characterized by uncertainty. The management of this tension has direct implications for how accountability is seen. There may be trade-offs and implications when and if one pole is stressed over another. For example, complex objectives and processes may be over-simplified so that they "fit in the boxes", given the focus on projects and short-term results. Or, at the other extreme – tools and systems may be developed that are too complicated for stakeholders to understand and use in everyday management. |
| Risks and Risk Management | CDIs and PBAs entail local ownership and long-term processes that are uncertain, and difficult to predict and control. Programming with these models is relatively new, and donor agencies such as CIDA are still experimenting and learning how to do this effectively. This requires a willingness to promote innovative approaches with uncertain outcomes, as well as incentive and reward systems that support learning and risk-taking. This comes into tension with the equally important Agency accountability requirement to the Government of Canada to demonstrate results, and to show value for money. Different strategies currently exist for how CIDA, CEAs and partners understand, assess and manage risk in CDIs and PBAs, some of which encourage new forms of risk assessment and others which are risk averse. |

| TOPIC AREA | UNDERLYING HYPOTHESIS OR ISSUES |
|---|---|
| Performance Monitoring & Measurement | Given the qualitative and relatively intangible nature of CD, defining CDI results that are meaningful and can be monitored effectively is a key challenge. For complex, long-term and multi-dimensional PBAs, defining a manageable number of indicators that can give valid indications of results performance over time is an important challenge. As a result, there is a tendency to "bean count" and focus on a limited number of "easy-to-use" quantitative indicators which can neither fulfill the on-going information needs of managers nor tell a "performance story". At the same time, performance measurement and monitoring tends to get "bogged down" in fulfilling the need for attribution leading to greater accountability.<br><br>The RBM principle of "learning by doing" also suggests that the full promise of RBM as a performance management approach will be realized when it is used as an iterative management approach, through learning from experience and making adjustments over time. Good RBM practice requires that CIDA have a culture and systems which support organizational learning, time and funds for training, reflection on practice in dialogue within the Agency, and between actors as they learn their way through management of their programs. This iterative approach also presumes some continuity among actors. Other requirements for iteration involve flexibility and mechanisms to adjust strategies to achieve results on the basis of actual experience. |
| Reporting, Evaluation and Audit | Demonstrating results in CDIs and PBAs is very complex, and involves multiple actors and levels of accountability. CDIs and PBAs require a "partnership-based" approach to programming and accountability. The key tension in practice is how to define who among the many actors and levels is accountable for what. In situations where a broad convergence of efforts contributes to results, it is difficult to attribute results to individual or single actor performance.<br><br>RBM ideally promotes greater transparency in reporting and analysis between CIDA and its partners. In practice there is an on-going tension between defining and disclosing results and obtaining project approval or support. This has key implications for how accountability is interpreted and applied in evaluation and reporting. |
| CIDA Institutional Context | RBM must be applied in an enabling institutional environment in CIDA so that accountability requirements are met in the most effective way possible. The Agency's institutional culture influences the ways in which RBM is applied and how accountability is viewed in practice, and plays a role in determining how individuals interpret and work with it in actual project and program management. The role of management systems, and CIDA's culture and incentives are key background factors. |

# Appendix III List of Review Participants

| KEY | INTERVIEWEE | ORGANIZATION | TITLE | LOCATION |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | Nipa Banerjee | CIDA | Head of Aid | Thailand |
| 2. | George Green | CIDA | Former RBM Specialist – Central and Eastern Europe Branch | Hull |
| 3. | Louise Filion | CIDA | Former RBM Specialist – Canadian Partnership Branch<br><br>Senior Development Officer -- United Nations and Commonwealth Program, Multilateral Branch | Hull |
| 4. | Louise Ouimet | DFAIT<br><br>(Formerly with CIDA) | Former RBM Specialist – Africa and Middle East Branch<br><br>Ambassador -- Mali | Mali |
| 5. | Mary Kurus | CIDA | Former RBM Specialist – Performance Review Branch<br><br>Policy Advisor – Strategic Planning and Policy Division, Asia Branch | Hull |
| 6. | Anne Lucie Lefebvre | CIDA | Development Officer – Mali Program | Hull |
| 7. | Sam Landon | CIDA | Development Officer – Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana Program | Hull |
| 8. | Jack Adams | CIDA | Head of Aid | Nicaragua |
| 9. | Wendy Miller | CIDA | Senior Development Officer – Indonesia, Philippines and South Pacific | Hull |
| 10. | Diana Merlini | CIDA | Senior Program Officer – Russia | Hull |
| 11. | Sarah Dowswell | CIDA | Program Manager – Malawi | Hull |
| 12. | David Spring | CIDA | Director General – China Division | Hull |

| KEY | INTERVIEWEE | ORGANIZATION | TITLE | LOCATION |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 13. | Paul Chambers | CIDA | Director – Central America Division | Hull |
| 14. | Rick Ward | CIDA | Director General – Russia, Ukraine and Nuclear Programs Division | Hull |
| 15. | Dan Thakur | CIDA | Senior Education Specialist – Eastern Africa and The Horn Program | Hull |
| 16. | John Saxby | CIDA | Senior Analyst – Social Dimensions, Canadian Partnership Branch | Hull |
| 17. | Ardith Molson | CIDA | Former Senior Development Officer, Senior Program Manager – United Nations and Commonwealth Program, Multilateral Branch<br><br>Policy and Strategic Planning, Africa and Middle East Branch | Hull |
| 18. | Anne Lavender | CIDA | Senior Policy Analyst – Policy and Strategic Planning, Policy Branch | Hull |
| 19. | Goberdan Singh | CIDA | Senior Performance Review Officer – Evaluation Unit, Performance Review Branch | Hull |
| 20. | Nicole Mendenhall | CIDA | Director – Audit Unit, Performance Review Branch | Hull |
| 21 | Cliff Trowell | Partners in Rural Development | Program Manager – Africa and the Caribbean | Ottawa |
| 22 | Angele Touchette | WUSC | Director of Education Services | Ottawa |
| 23 | Molly Kane | InterPares | Executive Director | Ottawa |
| 24 | Richard Patterson | CARE | Program Manager – Overseas Operations | Ottawa |
| 25 | Michel Chaurette | CECI | directeur général | Montreal |
| 26 | Paul Degiacomo | Agriteam | Social Development Specialist | Ottawa |
| 27 | Wendy Quarry | CoWater | Project Manager | Ottawa |
| 28 | Gary Anderson | Universalia | Coordinator – International Implementation Practice & Project Manager – Kosovo Educators Development Project | Montreal |
| 29 | Robert Ferrari | SNC Lavalin | President | Montreal |

| Key | Interviewee | Organization | Title | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 30 | Gary Holm | Agrodev | Manager – Natural Resource Services | Ottawa |
| 31 | Hussein Amery | ACCC | Director – International Programs | Ottawa |
| 32 | James Chauvin | CPHA | Assistant Director – IP | Ottawa |
| 33 | Jean Joseph Bellamy | ENACT (Jamaica) | Programme Manager | Jamaica |
| 34 | Ed Sutherland | Tree-Link (Malaysia) | Field Coordinator | Malaysia |
| 35 | Soumalia Diakite | CIDA – Bamako, Mali | Education Specialist | Mali |
| 36 | Rex Fyles | OXFAM | Coordinator – Humanitarian Assistance | Ottawa |

## Other Informants (for Illustrative Examples):

| Key | Interviewee | Organization | Title | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | Judith Sullivan | CIDA | Health Specialist - Central America Division | Hull |
| 2. | Saskia Arnold | CIDA | Development Officer – Honduras and Nicaragua | Hull |
| 3. | Lynn Racine | CIDA | Country Program Analyst – Pakistan and Afghanistan | Hull |
| 4. | Richard Basadur | CIDA | Program Officer – Russia | Hull |